Hardening IPv6 Network Devices

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Acknowledgements

- This material originated from the Cisco ISP/IXP Workshop Programme developed by Philip Smith & Barry Greene
 - These slides were developed by Dean Pemberton
- Use of these materials is encouraged as long as the source is fully acknowledged and this notice remains in place
- Bug fixes and improvements are welcomed
 - Please email workshop (at) bgp4all.com

Philip Smith

Agenda

Limiting Device Access
Secure SNMP Access
Securing the Data Path
Configuration and Archiving

Limiting Device Access


Think of ALL Devices

- The following problem was reported in 2013 and affects low-end CPEs (ADSL connections only)
 - Admin password exposed via web interface
 - Allow WAN management (this means anyone on Internet)
 - Bug fixed and reintroduced depending on the firmware version
- The bug is quite a number of years old

Password Visible via Web Interface

🔇 189 password.cgi × 🛨	
← → C ↑ ③ 189password.cgi	
Access Control Passwords	
Access to your DSL router is controll	
The user name "admin" has unrestric	🔇 view-source:189 × 🛨
	← → C ♣ ③ view-source:189. /password.cgi
The user name "support" is used to	
The user name "user" can access the	1 <html> 2 <head></head></html>
Use the fields below to enter up to :	<pre>3 <meta content="no-cache" http-equiv="Pragma"/> 4 <link admin';<="" href="stylemain.css" rel="stylesheet" td="" type='ter</pre></td></tr><tr><td></td><td><pre>4 </pre> 4 </pre></td></tr><tr><td>Username:</td><td>6 <script language="javascript" src="util.js"></s</p></td></tr><tr><td>Old Password:</td><td>7 <script language="javascript"></td></tr><tr><td>New Password:</td><td>8 <! hide</td></tr><tr><td>Confirm Password:</td><td>9
10 pwdAdmin = '/></pre>
Confirm Password:	11 pwdSupport = 'support';
	12 pwdUser = 'user';
	13
	14 function btnApply() {
	<pre>15 var loc = 'password.cgi?';</pre>
	16
	<pre>17 with (document.forms[0]) { 18 var idx = userName.selectedIndex;</pre>
	19 switch (idx) {
	20 case 0:
	21 alert("No username is selected.");
	22 return;

How CPE are Exploited



Magnitude of Problem

- 4.5 Million CPEs (ADSL Modems) using a unique malicious DNS
- In early 2012 more than 300,000 CPEs still infected
- 40 malicious DNS servers found
- Could device hardening have made a difference?

Device Physical Access

- Equipment kept in highly restrictive environments
- Console access
 - password protected
 - access via OOB management
 - configure timeouts
- Individual users authenticated
- Social engineering training and awareness

"If you can touch it... the device now belongs to you"

Interface Hardening

□ IPv4

- no ip proxy-arp
- no ip unreachables
- no ip redirects
- no ip directed-broadcast
- no ip mask-reply

□ IPv6

- no ipv6 unreachables
- no ipv6 redirects

Device Access Control

- Set passwords to something not easily guessed
- Use single-user passwords (avoid group passwords)
- Encrypt the passwords in the configuration files
- Use different passwords for different privilege levels
- Use different passwords for different modes of access
- IF AVAILABLE use digital certificate based authentication mechanisms instead of passwords

Secure Access with Passwords and Logout Timers



```
line console 0
login
password console-pw
exec-timeout 1 30
line vty 0 4
login
password vty-pw
exec-timeout 5 0
!
enable secret enable-secret
username dean secret dean-secret
```

Never Leave Passwords in Clear-Text


- service password-encryption command
- password command
 - Will encrypt all passwords on the Cisco IOS
 - with Cisco-defined encryption type "7"
 - Use "command password 7 <password>" for cut/paste operations"
 - Cisco proprietary encryption method
- secret command
 - Uses MD5 to produce a one-way hash
 - Cannot be decrypted
 - Use "command secret 5 <password>"
 - to cut/paste another "enable secret" password

Management Plane Filters

- Authenticate Access
- Define Explicit Access To/From Management Stations
 - SNMP
 - Syslog
 - TFTP
 - NTP
 - AAA Protocols
 - DNS
 - SSH, Telnet, etc.

Authenticate Individual Users





User Authentication: Good

From Cisco IOS 12.3, MD5 encryption was added for user passwords

Do NOT use type 7 encryption

(it is easy to reverse)

```
aaa new-model
aaa authentication login neteng local
username pfs secret 5 $1$j6Ac$3KarJszBV3VMaL/2Nio3E.
username dean secret 5 $1$LPV2$Q04NwAudy0/4AHHHQHvWj0
line vty 0 4
login neteng
access-class 3 in
```

User Authentication: Better

Use centralised authentication system

- RADIUS (not recommended for system security)
- TACACS+

```
aaa new-model
aaa authentication login default group tacacs+ enable
aaa authentication enable default group tacacs+ enable
aaa accounting exec start-stop group tacacs+
!
ip tacacs source-interface Loopback0
tacacs server IPv6-TP
address ipv6 2001:DB8::1
key CKr3t#
tacacs server IPv4-TP
address ipv4 192.168.1.1
key CKr3t#
line vty 0 4
access-class 3 in
```


Restrict Access To Trusted Hosts

Use filters to specifically permit hosts to access an infrastructure device


□ Example:

```
ip access-list extended VTY
permit tcp host 192.168.200.7 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 eq 22 log-input
permit tcp host 192.168.200.8 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 eq 22 log-input
permit tcp host 192.168.100.6 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255 eq 23 log-input
deny ip any any log-input
!
line vty 0 4
access-class VTY in
transport input ssh telnet
```

Using an SSH 'Jumphost'



Banner – What Is Wrong?




More Appropriate Banner



!!!! WARNING !!!! You have accessed a restricted device. All access is being logged and any unauthorized access will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law.

Device OOB Management



- Out-of-band device management should be used to ensure DoS attacks do not hinder getting access to critical infrastructure devices
- Dial-back encrypted modems are sometimes still used as backup

Device Management Common Practice (1)

- SSH used exclusively
 - Do NOT use Telnet, not even from Jumphosts
- HTTP and HTTPS access explicitly disabled
- All access authenticated
 - Varying password mechanisms
 - AAA usually used
 - Different servers for in-band vs OOB
 - Different servers for device authentication vs other
 - Static username pw or one-time pw
 - Single local database entry for backup

Device Management Common Practice (2)

- Each individual has specific authorization
- Strict access control via filtering
- Access is audited with triggered pager/email notifications
- SNMP is read-only
 - Restricted to specific hosts
 - View restricted if capability exists
 - Community strings updated every 30-90 days

Turn Off Unused Services

Global Services

- no service finger (before Cisco IOS 12.0)
- no ip finger
- no service pad
- no service udp-small-servers
- no service tcp-small-servers
- no ip bootp server
- no cdp run
- Interface Services
 - no ip redirects
 - no ip directed-broadcast
 - no ip proxy arp
 - no cdp enable

Secure SNMP Access

Secure SNMP Access

SNMP is primary source of intelligence on a target network!

Block SNMP from the outside

access-list 101 deny udp any any eq snmp

If the router has SNMP, protect it!

snmp-server community f00bAr RO 8
access-list 8 permit 127.1.3.5

Explicitly direct SNMP traffic to an authorized management station.
 snmp-server host fo0bAr 127.1.3.5

Secure SNMP Access



```
ipv6 access-list SNMP-PERMIT
  permit ipv6 2001:DB8:22::/64 any
  permit ipv6 any 2001:DB8:22::/64
!
no snmp community public
no snmp community private
!
snmp-server enable traps
snmp-server enable traps snmp authentication
snmp-server enable traps snmp coldstart
snmp-server trap-source Loopback0
snmp-server community v6comm RO ipv6 SNMP-PERMIT
```

SNMP Best Practices

Do not enable read/write access unless really necessary

- Read for access by Networking Monitoring System (eg LibreNMS)
- Write never!

Choose community strings that are difficult to guess

- Use same algorithm as for passwords
- Limit SNMP access to specific IP addresses

Limit SNMP output with views

Secure Logging Infrastructure


- Log enough information to be useful but not overwhelming.
- Create backup plan for keeping track of logging information should the syslog server be unavailable
- Remove private information from logs
- How accurate are your timestamps?
 - NTP needs to be configured
 - Synchronise with trusted time sources, eg pool.ntp.org or GPS receivers

Fundamental Device Protection Summary

- Secure logical access to routers with passwords and timeouts
- Never leave passwords in clear-text
- Authenticate individual users
- Restrict logical access to specified trusted hosts
- Allow remote vty access only through ssh
- Disable device access methods that are not used
- Protect SNMP if used
- Shut down unused interfaces
- Shut down unneeded services
- Ensure accurate timestamps for all logging
- Create appropriate banners
- Test device integrity on a regular basis

Securing the Data Path

Securing The Data Path



- Filtering and rate limiting are primary mitigation techniques
- Edge filter guidelines for ingress filtering (BCP38/BCP84)
- Null-route and black-hole any detected malicious traffic
- Netflow is primary method used for tracking traffic flows
- Logging of Exceptions

Data Plane (Packet) Filters

- Most common problems
 - Poorly-constructed filters
 - Ordering matters in some devices
- Scaling and maintainability issues with filters are commonplace
- Make your filters as modular and simple as possible
- Take into consideration alternate routes
 - Backdoor paths due to network failures

Filtering Deployment Considerations

- How does the filter load into the router?
- Does it interrupt packet flow?
- How many filters can be supported in hardware?
- How many filters can be supported in software?
- How does filter depth impact performance?
- How do multiple concurrent features affect performance?
- Do I need a standalone firewall?

General Filtering Best Practices

- Explicitly deny all traffic and only allow what you need
- The default policy should be that if the firewall doesn't know what to do with the packet, deny/drop it
- Don't rely only on your firewall for all protection of your network
- Implement multiple layers of network protection
- Make sure all of the network traffic passes through the firewall
- Log all firewall exceptions (if possible)

Ingress Filtering


ipv6 access-list INBOUND-iACL remark Permit the legitimate signaling traffic (BGP, EIGRP, PIM) permit tcp host 2001:db8:20::1 host 2001:db8:20::2 eq bqp permit tcp host 2001:db8:20::1 eq bqp host 2001:db8:20::2 permit 88 any any permit 103 any any remark Permit NDP packets permit icmp any any nd-na permit icmp any any nd-ns permit icmp any any router-advertisement permit icmp any any router-solicitation remark Deny RHO and other unknown extension headers deny ipv6 any any routing-type 0 log deny ipv6 any any log undetermined-transport remark Permit the legitimate management traffic permit tcp 2001:db8:11::/48 any eq 22 permit tcp 2001:db8:11::/48 any eq www permit udp 2001:db8:11::/48 any eq snmp remark Deny any packets to the infrastructure address space deny ipv6 any 2001:db8:2222::/48 deny ipv6 any 2001:db8:20::/48 permit ipv6 any any interface FastEthernet 0/0 description Connection to outside network ipv6 address 2001:db8:20::2/64 ipv6 traffic-filter INBOUND-iACL in

RFC2827 (BCP38) – Ingress Filtering

- If an ISP is aggregating routing announcements for multiple downstream networks, strict traffic filtering should be used to prohibit traffic which claims to have originated from outside of these aggregated announcements.
- The ONLY valid source IP address for packets originating from a customer network is the one assigned by the ISP (whether statically or dynamically assigned).
- An edge router could check every packet on ingress to ensure the user is not spoofing the source address on the packets which he is originating.

But What About Egress Filtering?

- In theory, certain addresses should not be seen on the global Internet
- In practice they are, and filters aren't being deployed (even when capability available)



ipv6 access-list DSL-ipv6-Outbound
 permit ipv6 2001:DB8:AA65::/48 any
 deny ipv6 any any log


interface atm 0/0
ipv6 traffic-filter DSL-ipv6-Outbound out

Configuration and archiving

System Images and Configuration Files

- Careful of sending configurations where people can snoop the wire
 - CRC or MD5 validation
 - Sanitize configuration files
- SCP should be used to copy files
 - TFTP and FTP should be avoided
- Use tools like 'RANCID' to periodically check against modified configuration files

Software and Configuration Upgrade / Integrity



- Files stored on specific systems with limited access
- All access to these systems are authenticated and audited
- SCP is used where possible; FTP is NEVER used; TFTP still used
- Configuration files are polled and compared on an hourly basis (RANCID)
- Filters limit uploading / downloading of files to specific systems
- Many system binaries use MD-5 checks for integrity
- Configuration files are stored with obfuscated passwords

Infrastructure Security Summary

- Every device in your network could be exploited so make sure to harden them all (especially change default username/passwords)
 - Printers, tablets, CPE's, etc
- Understand what you are sending in the clear from sending device to recipient and protect where needed
- Log and audit for trends since sometimes an abnormality can show the start of reconnaissance for a later attack

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