BGP Best Current Practices

ISP Workshops



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Acknowledgements


- This material originated from the Cisco ISP/IXP Workshop Programme developed by Philip Smith & Barry Greene
- Use of these materials is encouraged as long as the source is fully acknowledged and this notice remains in place
- Bug fixes and improvements are welcomed
 - Please email workshop (at) bgp4all.com

Configuring BGP

Where do we start?

Cisco IOS Good Practices

ISPs should start off with the following BGP commands as a basic template:



EBGP Configuration Best Practices

- Industry standard is described in RFC8212
 - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8212
 - External BGP (EBGP) Route Propagation Behaviour without Policies
- NB: BGP in Cisco IOS is permissive by default
 - This is contrary to industry standard and RFC8212
- Configuring BGP peering without using filters means:
 - All best paths on the local router are passed to the neighbour
 - All routes announced by the neighbour are received by the local router
 - Can have disastrous consequences (see RFC8212)

EBGP Configuration Best Practices

Best practice is to ensure that each eBGP neighbour has inbound and outbound filter applied:

```
router bgp 64511
address-family ipv4
neighbor 100.64.0.1 remote-as 64510
neighbor 100.64.0.1 prefix-list as64510-in in
neighbor 100.64.0.1 prefix-list as64510-out out
neighbor 100.64.0.1 activate
```

What is BGP for??

What is an IGP not for?

BGP versus OSPF/ISIS

- Internal Routing Protocols (IGPs)
 - Examples are IS-IS and OSPF
 - Used for carrying infrastructure addresses
 - NOT used for carrying Internet prefixes or customer prefixes
 - Design goal is to minimise number of prefixes in IGP to aid scalability and rapid convergence

BGP versus OSPF/IS-IS

- □ BGP is used
 - Internally (iBGP)
 - Externally (eBGP)
- □ iBGP is used to carry:
 - Some/all Internet prefixes across backbone
 - Customer prefixes
- □ eBGP is used to:
 - Exchange prefixes with other ASes
 - Implement routing policy

BGP versus OSPF/IS-IS

□ DO NOT:

- Distribute BGP prefixes into an IGP
- Distribute IGP routes into BGP
- Use an IGP to carry customer prefixes

YOUR NETWORK WILL NOT SCALE

Aggregation

Aggregation

- Aggregation means announcing the address block received from the RIR to the other ASes connected to your network
- Subprefixes of this aggregate may be:
 - Used internally in the ISP network
 - Announced to other ASes to aid with multihoming
- Too many operators are still thinking about class Cs, resulting in a proliferation of /24s in the Internet routing table
 - April 2019: 422499 /24s in IPv4 table of 743393 prefixes
- The same is happening for /48s with IPv6
 - April 2019: 30576 /48s in IPv6 table of 64203 prefixes

Configuring Aggregation – Cisco IOS

- □ ISP has 100.66.0.0/19 address block
- To put into BGP as an aggregate:

```
router bgp 64511
address-family ipv4
network 100.66.0.0 mask 255.255.224.0
ip route 100.66.0.0 255.255.224.0 null0
```

- The static route is a "pull up" route
 - More specific prefixes within this address block ensure connectivity to ISP's customers
 - "Longest match" lookup

Aggregation

- Address block should be announced to the Internet as an aggregate
- Subprefixes of address block should NOT be announced to Internet unless for traffic engineering
 - See BGP Multihoming presentations
- Aggregate should be generated internally
 - Not on the network borders!

Announcing Aggregate – Cisco IOS


Configuration Example

```
router bgp 64511
address-family ipv4
network 100.66.0.0 mask 255.255.224.0
neighbor 100.67.10.1 remote-as 101
neighbor 100.67.10.1 prefix-list out-filter out
neighbor 100.67.10.1 prefix-list default in
neighbor 100.67.10.1 activate
!
ip route 100.66.0.0 255.255.224.0 null0
!
ip prefix-list out-filter permit 100.66.0.0/19
ip prefix-list out-filter deny 0.0.0.0/0 le 32
!
ip prefix-list default permit 0.0.0.0/0
```

Announcing an Aggregate

- ISPs who don't and won't aggregate are held in poor regard by community
- Registries publish their minimum allocation size
 - For IPv4:
 - **1** /24
 - For IPv6:
 - /48 for assignment, /32 for allocation
- Until 2010, there was no real reason to see anything longer than a /22 IPv4 prefix in the Internet. But now?
 - IPv4 run-out is having an impact

Aggregation – Example



- Customer has /23 network assigned from AS100's /19 address block
- □ AS100 announces customers' individual networks to the Internet


Aggregation – Bad Example

- Customer link goes down
 - Their /23 network becomes unreachable
 - /23 is withdrawn from AS100's iBGP
- Their ISP doesn't aggregate its /19 network block
 - /23 network withdrawal announced to peers
 - Starts rippling through the Internet
 - Added load on all Internet backbone routers as network is removed from routing table

Customer link returns

- Their /23 network is now visible to their ISP
- Their /23 network is re-advertised to peers
- Starts rippling through Internet
- Load on Internet backbone routers as network is reinserted into routing table
- Some ISP's suppress the flaps
- Internet may take 10-20 min or longer to be visible
- Where is the Quality of Service???

Aggregation – Example



- Customer has /23 network assigned from AS100's /19 address block
- □ AS100 announced /19 aggregate to the Internet

Aggregation – Good Example

- Customer link goes down
 - Their /23 network becomes unreachable
 - /23 is withdrawn from AS100's iBGP
- 19 aggregate is still being announced
 - No BGP hold down problems
 - No BGP propagation delays
 - No damping by other ISPs -

- Customer link returns
- Their /23 network is visible again
 - The /23 is re-injected into AS100's iBGP
- The whole Internet becomes visible immediately
- Customer has Quality of Service perception

Aggregation – Summary

- Good example is what everyone should do!
 - Adds to Internet stability
 - Reduces size of routing table
 - Reduces routing churn
 - Improves Internet QoS for everyone
- Bad example is what too many still do!
 - Why? Lack of knowledge?
 - Laziness?

Separation of iBGP and eBGP

- Many ISPs do not understand the importance of separating iBGP and eBGP
 - iBGP is where all customer prefixes are carried
 - eBGP is used for announcing aggregate to Internet and for Traffic Engineering
- Do NOT do traffic engineering with customer originated iBGP prefixes
 - Leads to instability similar to that mentioned in the earlier bad example
 - Even though aggregate is announced, a flapping subprefix will lead to instability for the customer concerned
- Generate traffic engineering prefixes on the Border Router

The Internet Today (April 2019)

Current IPv4 Internet Routing Table Statistics

BGP Routing Table Entries	743393
Prefixes after maximum aggregation	285492
Unique prefixes in Internet	358279
/24s announced	422499
ASNs in use	63784

- (maximum aggregation is calculated by Origin AS)
- (unique prefixes > max aggregation means that operators are announcing aggregates from their blocks without a covering aggregate)

Efforts to improve aggregation

The CIDR Report

- Initiated and operated for many years by Tony Bates
- Now combined with Geoff Huston's routing analysis
 - www.cidr-report.org
 - (covers both IPv4 and IPv6 BGP tables)
- Results e-mailed on a weekly basis to most operations lists around the world
- Lists the top 30 service providers who could do better at aggregating
- RIPE Routing WG aggregation recommendations
 - IPv4: RIPE-399 www.ripe.net/ripe/docs/ripe-399.html
 - IPv6: RIPE-532 www.ripe.net/ripe/docs/ripe-532.html


Efforts to Improve Aggregation The CIDR Report

- Also computes the size of the routing table assuming ISPs performed optimal aggregation
- Website allows searches and computations of aggregation to be made on a per AS basis
 - Flexible and powerful tool to aid ISPs
 - Intended to show how greater efficiency in terms of BGP table size can be obtained without loss of routing and policy information
 - Shows what forms of origin AS aggregation could be performed and the potential benefit of such actions to the total table size
 - Very effectively challenges the traffic engineering excuse

Status Summary

Table History

Date	Prefixes	CIDR Aggregated
28-03-19	768712	414426
29-03-19	769289	417588
30-03-19	769629	418144
31-03-19	769670	418380
01-04-19	769328	418942
02-04-19	769399	418587
03-04-19	769506	419155
04-04-19	769330	419480



Plot: BGP Table Size

AS Summary

63957 Number of ASes in routing system


23407 Number of ASes announcing only one prefix

5658 Largest number of prefixes announced by an AS

AS8151: Uninet S.A. de C.V., MX

115975168 Largest address span announced by an AS (/32s)

AS4134: CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31, Jin-rong Street, CN



Plot: AS count

Plot: Average announcements per origin AS
Report: ASes ordered by originating address span

Report: ASes ordered by transit address span

Report: Autonomous System number-to-name mapping (from Registry WHOIS data)

```
Rank AS Type Originate Addr Space (pfx) Transit Addr space (pfx) Description
42 AS6389 ORG+TRN Originate: 16110080 /8.06 Transit: 93696 /15.48 BELLSOUTH-NET-BLK - AT&T Corp., US
```

Aggregation Suggestions

Filter: Aggregates, Specifics

Rank AS 22 <u>AS6389</u>	AS Name BELLSOUTH-NET-BLK - AT&T Corp., US	Current Wthdw Aggte Annce Redctn % 1553 1511 6 48 1505 96.91%
Prefix 12.81.90.0/23 12.81.120.0/24	AS Path 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389	Aggregation Suggestion
65.4.0.0/14 65.5.1.0/24 65.5.12.0/22		- matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389
65.5.20.0/23 65.5.21.0/24	4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - Withdrawn 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - Withdrawn	- matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389
65.5.24.0/22 65.5.32.0/20 65.5.34.0/24	4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - Withdrawn	- matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389
65.5.46.0/24 65.5.57.0/24 65.5.64.0/22	4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - Withdrawn	- matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389
65.5.68.0/22 65.5.80.0/22 65.5.88.0/21	4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - Withdrawn 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - Withdrawn	- matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389
65.5.118.0/23 65.5.120.0/21	4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - Withdrawn 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - Withdrawn	 matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389
65.5.132.0/23 65.5.133.0/24 65.5.136.0/22	4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - Withdrawn	- matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389
65.5.140.0/23 65.5.141.0/24 65.5.148.0/23	4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - Withdrawn	- matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389
65.5.150.0/23 65.5.152.0/21	4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - Withdrawn 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - Withdrawn	- matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389
65.5.156.0/22 65.5.160.0/22 65.5.164.0/22	4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - Withdrawn 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - Withdrawn	 matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389
65.5.172.0/22 65.5.200.0/21 65.5.228.0/22	4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - Withdrawn	- matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389
65.5.232.0/22 65.5.236.0/22 65.5.240.0/22	4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - Withdrawn	- matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389
65.5.244.0/22 65.5.248.0/22	4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - Withdrawn	- matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389 - matching aggregate 65.4.0.0/14 4777 2516 3356 7018 6389

```
Rank AS Type Originate Addr Space (pfx) Transit Addr space (pfx) Description

197 AS18566 ORG+TRN Originate: 3194624 /10.39 Transit: 8704 /18.91 MEGAPATH5-US - MegaPath Corporation, US
```

Aggregation Suggestions

Filter: Aggregates, Specifics

Rank AS	AS Name Current Wthdw Aggte Annee Redctn %
19 AS18566	MEGAPATH5-US - MegaPath Corporation, US 2109 1826 65 348 1761 83.50%
Prefix	AS Path Aggregation Suggestion
64.6.160.0/23	4777 2516 3257 18566
64.6.164.0/22	4777 2516 3257 18566 + Announce - aggregate of 64.6.164.0/23 (4777 2516 3257 18566) and 64.6.166.0/23 (4777 2516 3257 18566)
64.6.164.0/23	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.6.166.0/23 (4777 2516 3257 18566)
64.6.166.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.6.167.0/24 (4777 2516 3257 18566)
64.6.167.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.6.166.0/24 (4777 2516 3257 18566)
64.50.206.0/23	4777 2516 3257 18566
64.51.126.0/23	4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.0.0/16	4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.16.0/22	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.0.0/16 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.20.0/22	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.0.0/16 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.22.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.0.0/16 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.24.0/22	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.0.0/16 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.28.0/22	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.0.0/16 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.32.0/20	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.0.0/16 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.32.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.0.0/16 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.33.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.0.0/16 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.34.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.0.0/16 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.35.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.0.0/16 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.36.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.0.0/16 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.37.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.0.0/16 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.38.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.0.0/16 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.39.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.0.0/16 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.40.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.0.0/16 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.44.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.0.0/16 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.48.0/20	4777 2516 3257 18566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.0.0/16 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.48.0/23	4777 2516 3356 18566 + Announce - aggregate of 64.81.48.0/24 (4777 2516 3356 18566) and 64.81.49.0/24 (4777 2516 3356 18566)
64.81.48.0/24	4777 2516 3356 18566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.81.49.0/24 (4777 2516 3356 18566)
64.81.49.0/24	4777 2516 3356 18566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.81.48.0/24 (4777 2516 3356 18566)
64.81.50.0/24	4777 2516 3356 18566
64.81.52.0/22	4777 2516 3356 18566 + Announce - aggregate of 64.81.52.0/23 (4777 2516 3356 18566) and 64.81.54.0/23 (4777 2516 3356 18566)
64.81.52.0/24	4777 2516 3356 18566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.81.53.0/24 (4777 2516 3356 18566)
64.81.53.0/24	4777 2516 3356 18566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.81.52.0/24 (4777 2516 3356 18566)
64.81.54.0/24	4777 2516 3356 18566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.81.55.0/24 (4777 2516 3356 18566) 4777 2516 3356 18566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.81.54.0/24 (4777 2516 3356 18566)
64.81.55.0/24 64.81.56.0/22	47/7 2516 3356 18566 - Withgrawn - aggregated with 64.81.54.0/24 (47/7 2516 3356 18566) 4777 2516 3356 18566 + Announce - aggregate of 64.81.56.0/23 (4777 2516 3356 18566) and 64.81.58.0/23 (4777 2516 3356 18566)
64.81.56.0/24	47/7 2516 3356 18566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.81.57.0/24 (4777 2516 3356 18566)
64.81.57.0/24	4777 2516 3356 18566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.81.56.0/24 (4777 2516 3356 18566)

```
Rank AS Type Originate Addr Space (pfx) Transit Addr space (pfx) Description

176 AS7545 ORG+TRN Originate: 3732748 /10.17 Transit: 80343808 /5.74 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU
```

Aggregation Suggestions

14.200.26.0/24

4608 7575 7545

Filter: Aggregates, Specifics

```
Rank AS
                   AS Name
                                                               Current Wthdw Aggte Annce Redctn
 12 AS7545
                   TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU
                                                                  4727
                                                                         3008
                                                                                 832 2551 2176 46.03%
 Prefix
                     AS Path
                                                          Aggregation Suggestion
 14.2.0.0/19
                     4608 7575 7545 7545
 14.2.64.0/18
                     4608 7575 7545 7545
                                          + Announce - aggregate of 14.2.64.0/19 (4608 7575 7545 7545) and 14.2.96.0/19 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.2.64.0/19
                     4608 7575 7545 7545
                                          - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.2.96.0/19 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.2.96.0/19
                     4608 7575 7545 7545
                                          Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.2.64.0/19 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.2.192.0/20
                     4608 7575 7545 7545
                     4608 1221 2764 7545
 14.200.0.0/14
14.200.0.0/21
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 + Announce - aggregate of 14.200.0.0/22 (4608 7575 7545 7545) and 14.200.4.0/22 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.0.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.1.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.1.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.0.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.2.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.3.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.2.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.3.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.5.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.4.0/24
 14.200.5.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.4.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.6.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.7.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.7.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.6.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
                     4608 7575 7545
14.200.8.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545
 14.200.9.0/24
 14.200.10.0/23
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 + Announce - aggregate of 14.200.10.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545) and 14.200.11.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
                     4608 7575 7545 7545
 14.200.10.0/24
                                          - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.11.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
                     4608 7575 7545 7545
                                          - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.10.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.11.0/24
 14.200.12.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545
                     4608 9722 7545
 14.200.13.0/24
 14.200.14.0/23
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 + Announce - aggregate of 14.200.14.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545) and 14.200.15.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.14.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.15.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.15.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.14.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.16.0/21
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 + Announce - aggregate of 14.200.16.0/22 (4608 7575 7545 7545) and 14.200.20.0/22 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.16.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.17.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.17.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.16.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.18.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.19.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.19.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.18.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.20.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.21.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.20.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.21.0/24
 14.200.22.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.23.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.23.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.22.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
14.200.24.0/23
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 + Announce - aggregate of 14.200.24.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545) and 14.200.25.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.24.0/24
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.25.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
                     4608 7575 7545 7545 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.200.24.0/24 (4608 7575 7545 7545)
 14.200.25.0/24
```

```
Rank AS Type Originate Addr Space (pfx) Transit Addr space (pfx) Description
59 AS12479 ORG+TRN Originate: 12622080 /8.41 Transit: 213760 /14.29 UNI2-AS, ES
```

Aggregation Suggestions

Filter: Aggregates, Specifics

Rank AS	AS Name		Current					8		
4 <u>AS12479</u>	UNI2-AS, ES		5428	4444	764	1748	3680	67.80%	B	
Prefix	AS Path	Ag	gregation S	Suggesti	.on					
37.11.0.0/16	4777 2516	3356 12715 12479								
37.11.0.0/16	4777 2516	3356 5511 12479 + Announce -	aggregate o	f 37.11	.0.0/17	(4777	2516 33	56 5511	1 12479) and 37.11.128.0/17 (4777 2516 33	,5
37.11.0.0/22	4777 2516	3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -	aggregated	l with 3	7.11.4.	0/22 (4777 251	6 3356	5511 12479)	
37.11.4.0/22	4777 2516	3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -	aggregated	l with 3	7.11.0.	0/22 (4777 251	6 3356	5511 12479)	
37.11.8.0/22	4777 2516	3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -	aggregated	l with 3	7.11.12	.0/22	(4777 25	16 3356	5 5511 12479)	
37.11.12.0/22	4777 2516	3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -	aggregated	l with 3	7.11.8.	0/22 (4777 251	6 3356	5511 12479)	
37.11.16.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -								
37.11.20.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -					,		,	
37.11.24.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -					•		,	
37.11.28.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -								
37.11.32.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -								
37.11.36.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -								
37.11.40.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -								
37.11.44.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -					•		,	
37.11.48.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -								
37.11.52.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -					,			
37.11.56.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -					,			
37.11.60.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -					,		,	
37.11.64.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -								
37.11.68.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -								
37.11.72.0/22 37.11.76.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn - 3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -					,		,	
37.11.76.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -								
37.11.84.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -					•			
37.11.84.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -					•		,	
37.11.92.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -					•		,	
37.11.96.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -					•			
37.11.100.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -	33				•			
37.11.104.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -								
37.11.108.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -								
37.11.112.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -								
37.11.116.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -					,		*	
37.11.120.0/22	4777 2516	3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -	aggregated	with 3	7.11.12	4.0/22	(4777 2	516 335	56 5511 12479)	
37.11.124.0/22	4777 2516	3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -	aggregated	with 3	7.11.12	0.0/22	(4777 2	516 335	56 5511 12479)	
37.11.128.0/22	4777 2516	3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -	aggregated	l with 3	7.11.13	2.0/22	(4777 2	516 335	56 5511 12479)	
37.11.132.0/22		3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -								
37.11.136.0/22	4777 2516	3356 5511 12479 - Withdrawn -	aggregated	l with 3	7.11.14	0.0/22	(4777 2	516 335	56 5511 12479)	

Importance of Aggregation

- Size of routing table
 - Router Memory is not so much of a problem as it was in the 1990s
 - Routers routinely carry over 2 million prefixes
- Convergence of the Routing System
 - This is a problem
 - Bigger table takes longer for CPU to process
 - BGP updates take longer to deal with
 - BGP Instability Report tracks routing system update activity
 - bgpupdates.potaroo.net/instability/bgpupd.html

The BGP Instability Report

The BGP Instability Report is updated daily. This report was generated on 04 April 2019 07:49 (UTC+1000)

50 Most active ASes for the past 14 days

RANK	ASN	UPDs	%	Prefixes	UPDs/Prefix	AS NAME
1	1836	677735	4.69%	76	8917.57	GREEN green.ch AG Autonomous System, CH
2	13030	520496	3.60%	54	9638.81	INIT7, CH
3	1221	419932	2.90%	104978	4.00	ASN-TELSTRA Telstra Corporation Ltd, AU
4	6762	217343	1.50%	373	582.69	SEABONE-NET TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE S.p.A., IT
5	31736	164381	1.14%	14	11741.50	SENSELAN-AS senseLAN GmbH, CH
6	6776	158443	1.10%	18	8802.39	THENET Bern, Switzerland, CH
7	58299	158042	1.09%	14	11288.71	OPENFACTORY-AS, CH
8	9829	151089	1.04%	2758	54.78	BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone, IN
9	61098	139856	0.97%	17	8226.82	EXOSCALE, CH
10	27738	136309	0.94%	841	162.08	Ecuadortelecom S.A., EC
11	21232	125719	0.87%	21	5986.62	GGAMAUR, CH
12	4761	110800	0.77%	239	463.60	INDOSAT-INP-AP INDOSAT Internet Network Provider, ID
13	16509	105422	0.73%	2574	40.96	AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com, Inc., US
14	31662	104348	0.72%	9	11594.22	KNSURSELVA Kommunikations Netz Surselva, CH
15	61232	95348	0.66%	8	11918.50	REDIT, CH
16	198433	87273	0.60%	13		CFS, CH
17	9100	83316	0.58%	15	5554.40	ASPECTRA Zurich, Switzerland, CH
18	58057	83146	0.58%	10	8314.60	SECUREBIT Securebit Autonomous System Number, CH
19	16242	82728	0.57%	7	11818.29	MHS, CH
20	202054	81446	0.56%	8	10180.75	S4N-AS, ES
21	35518	80017	0.55%	7	11431.00	SASAG, CH
22	13904	77489	0.54%	155	499.93	COSLINK - Cherryland Services Inc, US
23	6772	75593	0.52%	7	10799.00	IMPNET-AS, CH
24	33965	74566	0.52%	9	8285.11	LITECOM Litecom AG, CH
25	24889	72244	0.50%	6	12040.67	MONZOON-AS, CH
26	25375	71268	0.49%	6	11878.00	LEU-AS, CH
27	20704	70414	0.49%	8	8801.75	FUNKNETZ-AS Hirschstettnerstr. 19-21 L1, AT

50 Most active Prefixes for the past 14 days

RANK	PREFIX	UPDs	%	Origin AS AS NAME
1	201.183.255.0/24	51581	0.34%	27738 Ecuadortelecom S.A., EC
2	187.188.66.0/24	44082	0.29%	22884 TOTAL PLAY TELECOMUNICACIONES SA DE CV, MX
3	82.196.154.0/24	38324	0.25%	29651 CTCS, RU
4	140.16.144.0/23	33568	0.22%	7224 AMAZON-AS - Amazon.com, Inc., US
5	216.238.254.0/23	31655	0.21%	13904 COSLINK - Cherryland Services Inc, US
6	114.4.20.0/23	24894	0.17%	4761 INDOSAT-INP-AP INDOSAT Internet Network Provider, ID
7	115.110.142.0/23	19280	0.13%	4755 TATACOMM-AS TATA Communications formerly VSNL is Leading ISP, IN
8	130.137.80.0/24	18995	0.13%	16509 AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com, Inc., US
9	185.129.42.0/24	18096	0.12%	206230 TECNITIA-MAD-ULIS, ES
10	130.137.78.0/24	17677	0.12%	16509 AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com, Inc., US
11	130.137.89.0/24	17648	0.12%	14618 AMAZON-AES - Amazon.com, Inc., US
12	103.88.171.0/24	17434	0.12%	136093 FAZNET-AS-ID PT Mitra Lintas Multimedia, ID
13	124.195.8.0/24	17375	0.12%	4761 INDOSAT-INP-AP INDOSAT Internet Network Provider, ID
14	88.221.28.0/22	17165	0.11%	6762 SEABONE-NET TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE S.p.A., IT
15	95.101.156.0/22	17155	0.11%	6762 SEABONE-NET TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE S.p.A., IT
16	103.65.238.0/24	17153	0.11%	135451 IDNIC-MASNETWORK-AS-ID PT Media Alvina Sejati, ID
17	92.123.208.0/22	17144	0.11%	6762 SEABONE-NET TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE S.p.A., IT
18	130.137.90.0/24	17142	0.11%	16509 AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com, Inc., US
19	92.122.68.0/22	17079		6762 SEABONE-NET TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE S.p.A., IT
20	88.221.100.0/22	17021	0.11%	6762 SEABONE-NET TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE S.p.A., IT
21	2.16.70.0/23	16972	0.11%	6762 SEABONE-NET TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE S.p.A., IT
22	124.195.18.0/24	16691	0.11%	4761 INDOSAT-INP-AP INDOSAT Internet Network Provider, ID
23	120.160.0.0/11	16676	0.11%	4761 INDOSAT-INP-AP INDOSAT Internet Network Provider, ID
24	114.0.10.0/24	16611	0.11%	4761 INDOSAT-INP-AP INDOSAT Internet Network Provider, ID
25	103.96.119.0/24	16588	0.11%	135451 IDNIC-MASNETWORK-AS-ID PT Media Alvina Sejati, ID
26	114.4.20.0/22	16586	0.11%	4761 INDOSAT-INP-AP INDOSAT Internet Network Provider, ID
27	130.137.81.0/24	15983	0.11%	16509 AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com, Inc., US
28	130.137.85.0/24	15938	0.11%	16509 AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com, Inc., US
29	103.96.118.0/24	15815		135451 IDNIC-MASNETWORK-AS-ID PT Media Alvina Sejati, ID
30	209.177.171.0/24	15735	0.10%	18465 WORKDAY-01 - Workday, Inc., US
31	68.70.217.0/24	15662	0.10%	13904 COSLINK - Cherryland Services Inc, US
32	68.70.218.0/24	15660	0.10%	13904 COSLINK - Cherryland Services Inc, US

The BGP IPv6 Instability Report

This report is updated daily. The current report was generated on 4 April 2019 01:24 (UTC+1000)

50 Most active ASes for the past 14 days

RANK	ΔSN	UPDs	0/_	Profives	UPDs/Prefix	AS NAME
1	55430		20.83%	285		STARHUB-NGNBN Starhub Ltd, SG
0						
2	12479	87149		1482		UNI2-AS, ES
3	<u>5603</u>	77323		13		SIOL-NET Telekom Slovenije d.d., SI
4	<u>26615</u>	73483		96		Tim Celular S.A., BR
5	10091	71525		46		STARHUB-CABLE StarHub Ltd, SG
6	9829	54136		444		BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone, IN
7	<u>30036</u>	45240	2.96%	728	62.14	MEDIACOM-ENTERPRISE-BUSINESS - Mediacom Communications Corp., US
8	<u>28176</u>	41592	2.72%	11	3781.09	Quick Soft tecnologia da Informacao Ltda, BR
9	53692	28639	1.87%	3	9546.33	ISN-4 - Interop Show Network, US
10	16657	27587	1.81%	19	1451.95	FIBERTECH-NETWORKS-AS-ROC-NY-US - Fibertech Networks, LLC, US
11	12208	22838	1.49%	18	1268.78	TRUVISTA - TruVista Communications, US
12	137413	22628	1.48%	2	11314.00	SANVIT-AS-AP Sanvit, KR
13	133804	20709	1.36%	1	20709.00	IDNIC-FIC-AS-ID PT FANGBIAN ISKAN CORPORINDO, ID
14	204819	20356	1.33%	1	20356.00	AS204819, GB
15	24534	19399	1.27%	3	6466.33	TRANSHYBRID-AS-ID PT. Transhybrid Communication, ID
16	33047	19220	1.26%	23	835.65	INSTART - Instart Logic, Inc, US
17	28573	17974	1.18%	1065	16.88	CLARO S.A., BR
18	132649	17803	1.17%	1	17803.00	ADAUNET-AS-ID PT Adau Putra Network, ID
19	49762	17415	1.14%	1	17415.00	SMN-AS, FI
20	12654	17255	1.13%	37	466.35	RIPE-NCC-RIS-AS Reseaux IP Europeens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC), NL
21	32629	16249	1.06%	2	8124.50	CITY-OF-CHARLOTTE-ASN - City of Charlotte, US
22	138576	14943	0.98%	4	3735.75	CODECCLOUD-AS-AP CodecCloud (HK) Limited, HK
23	30361	14134	0.92%	2	7067.00	SWIFTWILL2 - Swiftwill, Inc., US
24	9890	13027	0.85%	1	13027.00	ATOSINFOTECH-SG-AP ATOS Information Technology (Singapore) Pte Ltd, SG
25	16331	10294	0.67%	1	10294.00	TELE-ENTRE-FI-AS, FI
26	20940	10111	0.66%	506	19.98	AKAMAI-ASN1, US
27	266136	9126	0.60%	2	4563.00	R. P. DE B. ALVES SERVICOS E TELECOMUNICACOES - ME, BR

50 Most active Prefixes for the past 14 days

RANK	PREFIX	UPDs	%	Origin AS AS NAME
1	2607:f7a8:400::/39	31092	1.89%	16657 FIBERTECH-NETWORKS-AS-ROC-NY-US - Fibertech Networks, LLC, US
				46887 LIGHTOWER - Lightower Fiber Networks I, LLC, US
2	2620:144:a00::/40	28635		53692 ISN-4 - Interop Show Network, US
3	2604:2d80:8809::/48	21136		30036 MEDIACOM-ENTERPRISE-BUSINESS - Mediacom Communications Corp, US
4	2604:2d80:880c::/48	20867		30036 MEDIACOM-ENTERPRISE-BUSINESS - Mediacom Communications Corp, US
5	2001:df1:e400::/48	20709		133804 IDNIC-FIC-AS-ID PT FANGBIAN ISKAN CORPORINDO, ID
6	2a05:2080::/29	20356	1.24%	204819 AS204819, GB
7	2a03:8160:14::/48	19166	1.17%	33047 INSTART - Instart Logic, Inc, US
8	2406:e900::/48	17803	1.08%	132649 ADAUNET-AS-ID PT Adau Putra Network, ID
9	2001:67c:245c::/48	17415	1.06%	49762 SMN-AS, FI
10	2620:0:2f0::/48	16248	0.99%	32629 CITY-OF-CHARLOTTE-ASN - City of Charlotte, US
11	2404:9ec0:3::/48	14925	0.91%	138576 CODECCLOUD-AS-AP CodecCloud (HK) Limited, HK
12	2a01:9dc0::/32	14133	0.86%	30361 SWIFTWILL2 - Swiftwill, Inc., US
13	2a00:ad87:4600::/48	13027	0.79%	9890 ATOSINFOTECH-SG-AP ATOS Information Technology (Singapore) Pte Ltd, SG
14	2804:214:85c8::/48	12980	0.79%	26615 Tim Celular S.A., BR
15	2402:28c0:fffc::/48	11515	0.70%	137413 SANVIT-AS-AP Sanvit, KR
16	2a07:a905:ff10::/48	11113	0.68%	137413 SANVIT-AS-AP Sanvit, KR
17	2a00:ee2::/32	11048	0.67%	5603 SIOL-NET Telekom Slovenije d.d., SI
18	2a00:ee5::/32	11047	0.67%	5603 SIOL-NET Telekom Slovenije d.d., SI
19	2a00:ee3::/32	11046	0.67%	5603 SIOL-NET Telekom Slovenije d.d., SI
20	2a00:ee7::/32	11046	0.67%	5603 SIOL-NET Telekom Slovenije d.d., SI
21	2a00:ee6::/32	11044	0.67%	5603 SIOL-NET Telekom Slovenije d.d., SI
22	2a00:ee4::/32	11041	0.67%	5603 SIOL-NET Telekom Slovenije d.d., SI
23	2a00:ee1::/32	11036	0.67%	5603 SIOL-NET Telekom Slovenije d.d., SI
24	2a00:5240::/32	10294	0.63%	16331 TELE-ENTRE-FI-AS, FI
25	2804:214:85d8::/48	10167	0.62%	26615 Tim Celular S.A., BR
26	2404:9580::/33	9699	0.59%	24534 TRANSHYBRID-AS-ID PT. Transhybrid Communication, ID
27	2404:9580::/48	9698	0.59%	24534 TRANSHYBRID-AS-ID PT. Transhybrid Communication, ID
28	2804:14c:6181::/48	9485	0.58%	28573 CLARO S.A., BR
29	2804:3b38:3b38::/48	8898	0.54%	266136 R. P. DE B. ALVES SERVICOS E TELECOMUNICACOES - ME, BR
30	2a02:26f0:3800::/48	8691	0.53%	20940 AKAMAI-ASN1, US
31	2001:7fb:ff02::/48	7882	0.48%	12654 RIPE-NCC-RIS-AS Reseaux IP Europeens Network Coordination Centre (RIPE NCC), NL

Receiving Prefixes

Receiving Prefixes

- There are three scenarios for receiving prefixes from other ASNs
 - Customer talking BGP
 - Peer talking BGP
 - Upstream/Transit talking BGP
- Each has different filtering requirements and need to be considered separately

Receiving Prefixes: From Customers

- ISPs should only accept prefixes which have been assigned or allocated to their downstream customer
- If ISP has assigned address space to its customer, then the customer IS entitled to announce it back to his ISP
- If the ISP has NOT assigned address space to its customer, then:
 - Check in the five RIR databases to see if this address space really has been assigned to the customer
 - The tool: whois -h jwhois.apnic.net x.x.x.0/24
 - (jwhois is "joint whois" and queries all RIR databases)

Receiving Prefixes: From Customers

Example use of whois to check if customer is entitled to announce address space:
inetnum - means it is an

```
address delegation to an entity
$ whois -h jwhois.appric.net 202.12.29.0
inetnum:
                202.12.29.0 - 202.12.29.255
netname:
                APNIC-SERVICES-AU
descr:
                Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
                Regional Internet Registry for the Asia-Pacific Region
descr:
descr:
                6 Cordelia Street
descr:
                South Brisbane
                27.4731138 153.0141194 Portable – means its an
geoloc:
                                         assignment to the customer, the
country:
                ΑU
admin-c:
                AIC1-AP
                                         customer can announce it to you
tech-c:
                AIC1-AP
mnt-by:
                APNIC-HM
mnt-irt:
                IRT-APNIC-IS-AP
status:
                ASSIGNED PORTABLE
                hm-changed@apnic.net 20170327
changed:
                hm-changed@apnic.net 20170331
changed:
source:
                APNIC
```

Receiving Prefixes: From Customers

Example use of whois to check if customer is entitled to announce address space:

```
$ whois -h jwhois.apnic.net 193.128.0.0/16
inetnum:
                193.128.0.0 - 193.133.255.255
                UK-PIPEX-193-128-133
netname:
country:
                GB
                ORG-UA24-RTPE
orq:
admin-c:
                WERT1-RIPE
tech-c:
                UPHM1-RIPE
status:
                ALLOCATED UNSPECIFIED
remarks:
                Please send abuse notification to abuse@uk.uu.net
                RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT
mnt-by:
mnt-by:
                AS1849-MNT
mnt-routes:
                AS1849-MNT
                                          ALLOCATED - means that this is
mnt-routes:
                WCOM-EMEA-RICE-MNT
                                          Provider Aggregatable address
mnt-irt:
                IRT-MCI-GB
                                          space and can only be announced
created:
                2002-06-25T15:05:40Z
                                          by the ISP holding the allocation
last-modified:
                2016-10-31T12:20:01Z
                                          (in this case Verizon UK)
                RIPE
source:
```

Receiving Prefixes from customer: Cisco IOS

- For Example:
 - Downstream has 100.69.0.0/20 block
 - Should only announce this to upstreams
 - Upstreams should only accept this from them
- Configuration on upstream

```
router bgp 100
address-family ipv4
neighbor 100.67.10.1 remote-as 101
neighbor 100.67.10.1 prefix-list customer in
neighbor 100.67.10.1 prefix-list default out
neighbor 100.67.10.1 activate
!
ip prefix-list customer permit 100.69.0.0/20
!
ip prefix-list default permit 0.0.0.0/0
```

Receiving Prefixes: From Peers

- A peer is an ISP with whom you agree to exchange prefixes you originate into the Internet routing table
 - Prefixes you accept from a peer are only those they have indicated they will announce
 - Prefixes you announce to your peer are only those you have indicated you will announce

Receiving Prefixes: From Peers

- Agreeing what each will announce to the other:
 - Exchange of e-mail documentation as part of the peering agreement, and then ongoing updates

OR

 Use of the Internet Routing Registry and configuration tools such as the IRRToolSet

https://github.com/irrtoolset/irrtoolset

Receiving Prefixes from peer: Cisco IOS

- For Example:
 - Peer has 220.50.0.0/16, 61.237.64.0/18 and 81.250.128.0/17 address blocks
- Configuration on local router

```
router bgp 100
address-family ipv4
neighbor 100.67.10.1 remote-as 101
neighbor 100.67.10.1 prefix-list my-peer in
neighbor 100.67.10.1 prefix-list my-prefix out
neighbor 100.67.10.1 activate
!
ip prefix-list my-peer permit 220.50.0.0/16
ip prefix-list my-peer permit 61.237.64.0/18
ip prefix-list my-peer permit 81.250.128.0/17
ip prefix-list my-peer deny 0.0.0.0/0 le 32
!
ip prefix-list my-prefix permit 100.67.16.0/20
```

- Upstream/Transit Provider is an ISP who you pay to give you transit to the WHOLE Internet
- Receiving prefixes from them is not desirable unless really necessary
 - Traffic Engineering see BGP Multihoming presentations
- Ask upstream/transit provider to either:
 - originate a default-route

OR

announce one prefix you can use as default

Downstream Router Configuration

```
router bgp 100
address-family ipv4
network 100.66.0.0 mask 255.255.224.0
neighbor 100.65.7.1 remote-as 101
neighbor 100.65.7.1 prefix-list infilter in
neighbor 100.65.7.1 prefix-list outfilter out
neighbor 100.65.7.1 activate
!
ip prefix-list infilter permit 0.0.0.0/0
!
ip prefix-list outfilter permit 100.66.0.0/19
```

Upstream Router Configuration

```
router bgp 101
address-family ipv4
neighbor 100.65.7.2 remote-as 100
neighbor 100.65.7.2 default-originate
neighbor 100.65.7.2 prefix-list cust-in in
neighbor 100.65.7.2 prefix-list cust-out out
neighbor 100.65.7.2 activate
!
ip prefix-list cust-in permit 100.66.0.0/19
!
ip prefix-list cust-out permit 0.0.0.0/0
```

- If necessary to receive prefixes from any provider, care is required.
 - Don't accept default (unless you need it)
 - Don't accept your own prefixes
- Special use prefixes for IPv4 and IPv6:
 - http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6890.txt
- □ For IPv4:
 - Don't accept prefixes longer than /24 (?)
 - /24 was the historical class C
- □ For IPv6:
 - Don't accept prefixes longer than /48 (?)
 - □ /48 is the design minimum delegated to a site

- Check Team Cymru's list of "bogons"
 - http://www.team-cymru.com/bogon-reference.html
- □ For IPv4 also consult:
 - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6441.txt (BCP171)
- □ For IPv6 also consult:
 - http://www.space.net/~gert/RIPE/ipv6-filters.html
- Bogon Route Server:
 - https://www.team-cymru.com/bogon-reference-bgp.html
 - Supplies a BGP feed (IPv4 and/or IPv6) of address blocks which should not appear in the BGP table

Receiving IPv4 Prefixes

```
router bgp 100
 network 101.10.0.0 mask 255.255.224.0
neighbor 100.65.7.1 remote-as 101
neighbor 100.65.7.1 prefix-list in-filter in
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 0.0.0.0/0
                                                     ! Default
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 0.0.0.0/8 le 32
                                                     ! RFC1122 local host
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 10.0.0.0/8 le 32
                                                     ! RFC1918
ip prefix-list in-filter denv 100.64.0.0/10 le 32
                                                     ! RFC6598 shared address
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 101.10.0.0/19 le 32
                                                     ! Local prefix
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 127.0.0.0/8 le 32
                                                     ! Loopback
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 169.254.0.0/16 le 32
                                                     ! Auto-config
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 172.16.0.0/12 le 32
                                                     ! RFC1918
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 192.0.0.0/24 le 32
                                                     ! RFC6598 IETF protocol
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 192.0.2.0/24 le 32
                                                     ! TEST1
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 192.168.0.0/16 le 32
                                                     ! RFC1918
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 198.18.0.0/15 le 32
                                                     ! Benchmarking
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 198.51.100.0/24 le 32 ! TEST2
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 203.0.113.0/24 le 32
                                                     ! TEST3
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 224.0.0.0/3 le 32
                                                     ! Multicast & Experimental
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 0.0.0.0/0 ge 25
                                                     ! Prefixes >/24
ip prefix-list in-filter permit 0.0.0.0/0 le 32
```

Receiving IPv6 Prefixes

```
router bgp 100
network 2020:3030::/32
neighbor 2020:3030::1 remote-as 101
neighbor 2020:3030::1 prefix-list v6in-filter in
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter permit 64:ff9b::/96
                                                           ! RFC6052 v4v6trans
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter deny 2001::/23 le 128
                                                           ! RFC2928 IETF prot
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter deny 2001:2::/48 le 128
                                                           ! Benchmarking
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter deny 2001:10::/28 le 128
                                                           ! ORCHID
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter deny 2001:db8::/32 le 128
                                                           ! Documentation
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter deny 2002::/16 le 128
                                                           ! Deny all 6to4
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter deny 2020:3030::/32 le 128
                                                           ! Local Prefix
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter deny 3ffe::/16 le 128
                                                           ! Formerly 6bone
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter permit 2000::/3 le 48
                                                           ! Global Unicast
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter deny ::/0 le 128
```

Note: These filters block Teredo (serious security risk) and 6to4 (deprecated by RFC7526)

Receiving Prefixes

- Paying attention to prefixes received from customers, peers and transit providers assists with:
 - The integrity of the local network
 - The integrity of the Internet
- Responsibility of all ISPs to be good Internet citizens

Prefixes into iBGP

Injecting prefixes into iBGP

- Use iBGP to carry customer prefixes
 - Don't use IGP
- □ Point static route to customer interface
- Use BGP network statement
- As long as static route exists (interface active), prefix will be in BGP

Router Configuration: network statement

■ Example:

```
interface loopback 0
  ip address 100.64.3.1 255.255.255.255
!
interface Serial 5/0
  ip unnumbered loopback 0
  ip verify unicast reverse-path
!
ip route 100.71.10.0 255.255.252.0 Serial 5/0
!
router bgp 100
  address-family ipv4
  network 100.71.10.0 mask 255.255.252.0
!
```

Injecting prefixes into iBGP

- Interface flap will result in prefix withdraw and reannounce
 - USE "ip route . . . permanent"
- Many ISPs redistribute static routes into BGP rather than using the network statement
 - Only do this if you understand why

Router Configuration: redistribute static

Example:

```
ip route 100.71.10.0 255.255.252.0 Serial 5/0
!
router bgp 100
  address-family ipv4
  redistribute static route-map static-to-bgp
<snip>
!
route-map static-to-bgp permit 10
  match ip address prefix-list ISP-block
  set origin igp
  set community 100:1000
<snip>
!
ip prefix-list ISP-block permit 100.71.10.0/22 le 30
```

Injecting prefixes into iBGP

- Route-map static-to-bgp can be used for many things:
 - Setting communities and other attributes
 - Setting origin code to IGP, etc
- Be careful with prefix-lists and route-maps
 - Absence of either/both means all statically routed prefixes go into iBGP

Summary

- Best Practices Covered:
 - When to use BGP
 - When to use ISIS/OSPF
 - Aggregation
 - Receiving Prefixes
 - Prefixes into BGP

Route Origin Authorisation

Steps to securing the Routing System

What is RPKI?

- Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
 - A security framework for verifying the association between resource holder and their Internet resources
 - Created to address the issues discussed in RFC 4593 "Generic Threats to Routing Protocols" (Oct 2006)
- Helps to secure Internet routing by validating routes
 - Proof that prefix announcements are coming from the legitimate holder of the resource
 - RFC 6480 An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing (Feb 2012)

Benefits of RPKI - Routing

- Prevents route hijacking
 - A prefix originated by an AS without authorisation
 - Reason: malicious intent
- Prevents mis-origination
 - A prefix that is mistakenly originated by an AS which does not own it
 - Also route leakage
 - Reason: configuration mistake / fat finger

BGP Security (BGPsec)

- Extension to BGP that provides improved security for BGP routing
- Being worked on by the SIDR Working Group at IETF
- Implemented via a new optional non-transitive BGP attribute that contains a digital signature
- Two components:
 - BGP Prefix Origin Validation (using RPKI)
 - BGP Path Validation

Route Origin Authorisation (ROA)

- A digital object that contains a list of address prefixes and one AS number
- It is an authority created by a prefix holder to authorise an AS Number to originate one or more specific route advertisements
- Publish a ROA using your RIR member portal

Route Origin Validation

- Router must support RPKI
- □ Checks an RP cache / validator
- Validation returns 3 states:
 - Valid = when authorization is found for prefix X
 - Invalid = when authorization is found for prefix X but not from ASN Y
 - Unknown = when no authorization data is found

Route Origin Validation

Vendor support:

- Cisco IOS available in release 15.2
- Cisco IOS/XR available in release 4.3.2
- Juniper available in release 12.2
- Nokia available in release R12.0R4
- Huawei available in release V800R009C10
- Brocade available in release TBA

RPKI Validator Caches

- NLnet Labs Routinator
 - https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/rpki/routinator/
 - https://github.com/NLnetLabs/routinator
- Dragon Research validator
 - https://rpki.net
 - https://github.com/dragonresearch/rpki.net/
- RIPE NCC validator
 - https://github.com/RIPE-NCC/rpki-validator-3/wiki

Configure Router to Use Cache: Cisco IOS

- Point router to the local RPKI cache
 - Server listens on port 43779
 - Example:

```
router bgp 64512
bgp rpki server tcp 10.0.0.3 port 43779 refresh 60
```

 Once the router's RPKI table is populated, router indicates validation state in the BGP table

BGP Table (IPv4)

```
RPKI validation codes: V valid, I invalid, N Not found
               Metric LocPrf Path
Network
N*> 1.0.4.0/24
                             37100 6939 4637 1221 38803 56203 i
N*> 1.0.5.0/24
                             37100 6939 4637 1221 38803 56203 i
V*> 1.9.0.0/16
                             37100 4788 i
                            37100 10026 18046 17408 58730 i
N*> 1.10.8.0/24
N*> 1.10.64.0/24
                             37100 6453 3491 133741 i
V*> 1.37.0.0/16
                             37100 4766 4775 i
N*> 1.38.0.0/23
                            37100 6453 1273 55410 38266 i
N*> 1.38.0.0/17
                             37100 6453 1273 55410 38266 {38266} i
I* 5.8.240.0/23
                             37100 44217 3178 i
I* 5.8.241.0/24
                            37100 44217 3178 i
I* 5.8.242.0/23
                             37100 44217 3178 i
I* 5.8.244.0/23
                             37100 44217 3178 i
```

Courtesy of SEACOM: http://as37100.net

BGP Table (IPv6)

```
RPKI validation codes: V valid, I invalid, N Not found
                    Metric LocPrf Path
Network
N*> 2001::/32
                                  37100 6939 i
    2001:4:112::/48
N*
                                  37100 112 i
. . .
V*> 2001:240::/32
                                   37100 2497 i
N*> 2001:250::/48
                                   37100 6939 23911 45
N*> 2001:250::/32
                                   37100 6939 23911 23910 i
V*> 2001:348::/32
                                   37100 2497 7679 i
N*> 2001:350::/32
                                   37100 2497 7671 i
N*> 2001:358::/32
                                   37100 2497 4680 i
I* 2001:1218:101::/48
                                   37100 6453 8151 278 i
I* 2001:1218:104::/48
                                   37100 6453 8151 278 i
    2001:1221::/48
N*
                                   37100 2914 8151 28496 i
N*> 2001:1228::/32
                                   37100 174 18592 i
```

Courtesy of SEACOM: http://as37100.net

RPKI BGP State: Valid

RPKI BGP State: Invalid

```
BGP routing table entry for 2001:1218:101::/48, version 149538323
Paths: (2 available, no best path)
Not advertised to any peer
Refresh Epoch 1
37100 6453 8151 278
2C0F:FEB0:B:3::1 (FE80::86B5:9C00:15F5:7C00) from
2C0F:FEB0:B:3::1 (105.16.0.162)
Origin IGP, metric 0, localpref 100, valid, external
Community: 37100:1 37100:12
path 0DA7D4FC RPKI State invalid
rx pathid: 0, tx pathid: 0
```

RPKI BGP State: Not Found

```
BGP routing table entry for 2001:200::/32, version 124240929

Paths: (2 available, best #2, table default)

Not advertised to any peer

Refresh Epoch 1

37100 2914 2500

2C0F:FEB0:11:2::1 (FE80::2A8A:1C00:1560:5BC0) from

2C0F:FEB0:11:2::1 (105.16.0.131)

Origin IGP, metric 0, localpref 100, valid, external, best

Community: 37100:1 37100:13

path 19D90E68 RPKI State not found

rx pathid: 0, tx pathid: 0x0
```

Configure Router to Use Cache: JunOS

Connect to validation cache:

```
routing-options {
  validation {
    group ISP {
      session 10.0.0.3;
      port 43779;
      refresh-time 600;
      hold-time 1800;
    }
  }
}
```

(using same parameters as for the Cisco IOS example)

Configure Router to Use Cache: JunOS

2. Configure validation policies:

```
policy-options {
 policy-statement RPKI-validation {
    term VALID {
      from {
        protocol bqp;
        validation-database valid;
      then {
        validation-state valid;
        next policy;
    term INVALID {
      from {
        protocol bgp;
        validation-database invalid;
      then {
        validation-state invalid;
        next policy;
```

```
(continued)...

term UNKNOWN {
    from {
      protocol bgp;
      validation-database unknown;
    }
    then {
      validation-state unknown;
      next policy;
    }
  }
}
```

Configure Router to Use Cache: JunOS

3. Apply policy to eBGP session:

```
protocols {
  bgp {
    group EBGP {
      type external;
      local-address 10.0.1.1;
      neighbor 10.1.15.1 {
        description "ISP Upstream";
        import [ RPKI-validation Upstream-in ];
        export LocalAS-out;
        peer-as 64511;
      }
    }
}
```

Note that policy options Upstream-in and LocalAS-out are the typical inbound and outbound filters needed for an eBGP session

Using RPKI

- Network operators can make decisions based on RPKI state:
 - Invalid discard the prefix several do this now!
 - Not found let it through (maybe low local preference)
 - Valid let it through (high local preference)
- Some operators even considering making "not found" a discard event
 - But then Internet IPv4 BGP table would shrink to about 55000 prefixes and the IPv6 BGP table would shrink to about 9600 prefixes!

RPKI Summary

- All AS operators must consider deploying
 - Which means: Signing ROAs & dropping invalids
- An important step to securing the routing system
 - Origin validation
- Doesn't secure the path, but that's the next hurdle to cross
- With origin validation, the opportunities for malicious or accidental mis-origination disappear
- □ FAQ:
 - https://nlnetlabs.nl/projects/rpki/faq/

Configuration Tips

Of passwords, tricks and templates

iBGP and IGPs Reminder!

- Make sure loopback is configured on router
 - iBGP between loopbacks, NOT real interfaces
- Make sure IGP carries loopback IPv4 /32 and IPv6 /128 address
- Consider the DMZ nets:
 - Use unnumbered interfaces?
 - Use next-hop-self on iBGP neighbours
 - Or carry the DMZ IPv4 /30s and IPv6 /127s in the iBGP
 - Basically keep the DMZ nets out of the IGP!

iBGP: Next-hop-self

- BGP speaker announces external network to iBGP peers using router's local address (loopback) as next-hop
- Used by many ISPs on edge routers
 - Preferable to carrying DMZ point-to-point link addresses in the IGP
 - Reduces size of IGP to just core infrastructure
 - Alternative to using unnumbered interfaces
 - Helps scale network
 - Many ISPs consider this "best practice"

Limiting AS Path Length

- Some BGP implementations have problems with long AS_PATHS
 - Memory corruption
 - Memory fragmentation
- Even using AS_PATH prepends, it is not normal to see more than 20 ASes in a typical AS_PATH in the Internet today
 - The Internet is around 5 ASes deep on average
 - Largest AS_PATH is usually 16-20 ASNs

neighbor x.x.x.x maxas-limit 20

Limiting AS Path Length

- Some announcements have ridiculous lengths of AS-paths
 - This example is an error in one IPv6 implementation

This example shows 100 prepends (for no obvious reason)

```
*>i193.105.15.0

2516 3257 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 50404 504
```


If your implementation supports it, consider limiting the maximum AS-path length you will accept

BGP Maximum Prefix Tracking

- Allow configuration of the maximum number of prefixes a BGP router will receive from a peer
- Two level control:
 - Warning threshold: log warning message
 - Maximum: tear down the BGP peering, manual intervention required to restart neighbor <x.x.x> maximum-prefix <max> [restart N] [<threshold>] [warning-only]
- restart is an optional keyword which will restart the BGP session N minutes after being torn down
- threshold is an optional parameter between 1 to 100
 - Specify the percentage of <max> that will cause a warning message to be generated. Default is 75%.
- warning-only is an optional keyword which allows log messages to be generated but peering session will not be torn down

BGP TTL "hack"

- □ Implement RFC5082 on BGP peerings
 - (Generalised TTL Security Mechanism)
 - Neighbour sets TTL to 255
 - Local router expects TTL of incoming BGP packets to be 254
 - No one apart from directly attached devices can send BGP packets which arrive with TTL of 254, so any possible attack by a remote miscreant is dropped due to TTL mismatch



BGP TTL "hack"

- TTL Hack:
 - Both neighbours must agree to use the feature
 - TTL check is much easier to perform than MD5
 - (Called BTSH BGP TTL Security Hack)
- Provides "security" for BGP sessions
 - In addition to packet filters of course
 - MD5 should still be used for messages which slip through the TTL hack
 - See

https://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog27/presentations/meyer.pdf for more details

BGP TTL "hack"

Configuration example:

```
neighbor 100.121.0.2 ttl-security hops 1
```

■ BGP neighbour status:

```
Router# sh ip bgp neigh 100.121.0.2
...
Mininum incoming TTL 254, Outgoing TTL 255
Local host: 100.121.0.1, Local port: 41103
Foreign host: 100.121.0.2, Foreign port: 179
```

- The neighbour must set the same configuration
 - If they don't, the BGP session will not come up

Templates

- Good practice to configure templates for everything
 - Vendor defaults tend not to be optimal or even very useful for ISPs
 - ISPs create their own defaults by using configuration templates
- eBGP and iBGP examples follow
 - Also see Team Cymru's BGP templates
 - http://www.team-cymru.com/community-services.html

iBGP Template Example

- iBGP between loopbacks!
- Next-hop-self
 - Keep DMZ and external point-to-point out of IGP
- Always send communities in iBGP
 - Otherwise BGP policy accidents will happen
 - (Default on some vendor implementations, optional on others)
- □ Hardwire BGP to version 4
 - Yes, this is being paranoid!
 - Prevents accidental configuration of BGP version 3 which is still supported in some implementations

iBGP Template Example continued

- Use passwords on iBGP session
 - Not being paranoid, VERY necessary
 - It's a secret shared between you and your peer
 - If arriving packets don't have the correct MD5 hash, they are ignored
 - Helps defeat miscreants who wish to attack BGP sessions
- Powerful preventative tool, especially when combined with filters and the TTL "hack"

eBGP Template Example

- BGP damping
 - Do NOT use it unless you understand the impact
 - Do NOT use the vendor defaults without thinking
- Cisco's Soft Reconfiguration
 - Do NOT use unless troubleshooting it will consume considerable amounts of extra memory for BGP
- Remove private ASes from announcements
 - Common omission today
- Use extensive filters, with "backup"
 - Use AS-path filters to backup prefix filters
 - Keep policy language for implementing policy, rather than basic filtering

eBGP Template Example continued

- Use password agreed between you and peer on eBGP session
- Use maximum-prefix tracking
 - Router will warn you if there are sudden increases in BGP table size, bringing down eBGP if desired
- Limit maximum as-path length inbound
- Log changes of neighbour state
 - ...and monitor those logs!
- Make BGP admin distance higher than that of any IGP
 - Otherwise prefixes heard from outside your network could override your IGP!!

Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security

Industry Best Practices to ensure Security of the Routing System



Routing Security

Implement the recommendations in https://www.manrs.org/manrs



- 1. Prevent propagation of incorrect routing information
 - > Filter BGP peers, in & out!
- 2. Prevent traffic with spoofed source addresses
 - BCP38 Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding
- 3. Facilitate communication between network operators
 - > NOC to NOC Communication
- 4. Facilitate validation of routing information
 - Route Origin Authorisation using RPKI

MANRS 1)

- Filtering prefixes inbound and outbound
 - RFC8212 requires all EBGP implementations to reject prefixes received and announced in the absence of any policy
- Advice: Never set up an EBGP session without inbound and outbound prefix filters
 - If full table required, block at least the bogons (see earlier)

MANRS 2)

- □ Implementing BCP 38
 - Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding
 - (Deny outbound traffic from customers which has spoofed source addresses)
- Advice: implement uRPF on all single-homed customer facing interfaces
 - Cheaper (CPU & RAM) than implementing packet filters

MANRS 3)

- □ Facilitate NOC to NOC communication
 - Know the direct NOC contacts for your customer Network Operators, your peer Network Operators, and your upstream Network Operators
 - This is not calling their "customer support line"
 - Make sure NOC contact info is part of any service contract
- Advice: NOC contact info for all connected Autonomous Networks is known to your NOC

MANRS 4)

- Facilitate validation of Routing Information
 - RPKI and Route Origin Authorisation (ROA)
 - All routes originated need to be signed to indicate that your AS is authorised to originate these routes
 - Helps secure the global routing system
- Advice: Sign ROAs for all originated routes using RPKI
 - And make sure all customer originated routes are also signed
 - Validate received routes from all peers
 - High priority to validated routes
 - Discard invalid routes
 - Low priority for unsigned routes

MANRS summary

- If your organisation supports and implements all 4 techniques in your network
 - Then join MANRS
 - https://www.manrs.org/join/



- MANRS for Operators
- MANRS for IXPs

Summary

- Use configuration templates
- Standardise the configuration
- Be aware of standard "tricks" to avoid compromise of the BGP session
- Anything to make your life easier, network less prone to errors, network more likely to scale
- Implement the four fundamentals of MANRS
- It's all about scaling if your network won't scale, then it won't be successful

BGP Best Current Practices

ISP Workshops