## **BGP Best Current Practices**

### **ISP** Workshops



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
## Acknowledgements

- This material originated from the Cisco ISP/IXP Workshop Programme developed by Philip Smith & Barry Greene
- Use of these materials is encouraged as long as the source is fully acknowledged and this notice remains in place
- Bug fixes and improvements are welcomed
  - Please email workshop (at) bgp4all.com

Philip Smith

### **BGP** Videos

- NSRC has made a video recording of this presentation, as part of a library of BGP videos for the whole community to use:
  - https://learn.nsrc.org/bgp#bgp\_best\_practices




# Configuring BGP

Where do we start?

### Cisco IOS Good Practices

Network Operators should start off with the following BGP commands as a basic template:



### EBGP Default Behaviour

#### Industry standard is described in RFC8212

- https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8212
- External BGP (EBGP) Route Propagation Behaviour without Policies

### NB: BGP in Cisco IOS is permissive by default

This is contrary to industry standard and RFC8212

Configuring BGP peering without using filters means:

- All best paths on the local router are passed to the neighbour
- All routes announced by the neighbour are received by the local router
- Can have disastrous consequences (see RFC8212)

### EBGP Default Behaviour

Best practice is to ensure that each EBGP neighbour has inbound and outbound filter applied:

```
router bgp 64511
address-family ipv4
neighbor 100.64.0.1 remote-as 64510
neighbor 100.64.0.1 prefix-list as64510-in in
neighbor 100.64.0.1 prefix-list as64510-out out
neighbor 100.64.0.1 activate
```

### EBGP Default Behaviour

#### ■ FRR turns on RFC8212 support by default:

#### https://frrouting.org/

```
frr.pfs.lab(config)# router bgp 64512 view LAB
frr.pfs.lab(config-router)# bgp ?
<snip>
ebgp-requires-policy Require in and out policy for eBGP peers (RFC8212)
<snip>
```

No prefixes will be sent or received to external peers in the absence of inbound and outbound policy

## What is BGP for??

What is an IGP not for?

## BGP versus OSPF/ISIS

Internal Routing Protocols (IGPs)

- Examples are IS-IS and OSPF
- Used for carrying infrastructure addresses
- NOT used for carrying Internet prefixes or customer prefixes
- Design goal is to minimise number of prefixes in IGP to aid scalability and rapid convergence

## BGP versus OSPF/IS-IS

- BGP is used
  - Internally (IBGP)
  - Externally (EBGP)
- □ IBGP is used to carry:
  - Some/all Internet prefixes across backbone
  - Customer prefixes
- EBGP is used to:
  - Exchange prefixes with other ASes
  - Implement routing policy

## BGP versus OSPF/IS-IS

### DO NOT:

- Distribute BGP prefixes into an IGP
- Distribute IGP routes into BGP
- Use an IGP to carry customer prefixes

### **YOUR NETWORK WILL NOT SCALE**



## Aggregation

- Aggregation means announcing the address block received from the RIR to the other ASes connected to your network
- Subprefixes of this aggregate may be:
  - Used internally in the provider network
  - Announced to other ASes to aid with multihoming
- Too many operators are still thinking about class Cs, resulting in a proliferation of /24s in the Internet routing table
  - June 2023: 555542 /24s in IPv4 table of 925195 prefixes
- The same is happening for /48s with IPv6
  - June 2023: 85690 /48s in IPv6 table of 174464 prefixes

## Configuring Aggregation – Cisco IOS

- Service Provider has 100.66.0.0/19 address block
- To put into BGP as an aggregate:

```
router bgp 64511
address-family ipv4
network 100.66.0.0 mask 255.255.224.0
ip route 100.66.0.0 255.255.224.0 null0
```

□ The static route is a "pull up" route

- More specific prefixes within this address block ensure connectivity to Service Provider's customers
- Longest match" lookup

## Aggregation

- Address block should be announced to the Internet as an aggregate
- Subprefixes of address block should NOT be announced to Internet unless for traffic engineering
  - See BGP Multihoming presentations
- Aggregate should be generated internally
  - Not on the network borders!

### Announcing Aggregate – Cisco IOS

#### Configuration Example

```
router bgp 64511
address-family ipv4
network 100.66.0.0 mask 255.255.224.0
neighbor 100.67.10.1 remote-as 101
neighbor 100.67.10.1 prefix-list out-filter out
neighbor 100.67.10.1 prefix-list default in
neighbor 100.67.10.1 activate
!
ip route 100.66.0.0 255.255.224.0 null0
!
ip prefix-list out-filter permit 100.66.0.0/19
ip prefix-list out-filter deny 0.0.0.0/0 le 32
!
ip prefix-list default permit 0.0.0.0/0
```


## Announcing an Aggregate

- Network Operators who don't and won't aggregate are held in poor regard by community
- Registries publish their minimum allocation size
  - For IPv4:
    - □ /24
  - For IPv6:

48 for assignment, /32 for allocation

Until 2010, there was no real reason to see anything longer than a /22 IPv4 prefix on the Internet. But now?

- IPv4 run-out is having an impact
- It is expected that eventually the global IPv4 table will be mostly /24s



- Customer has /23 network assigned from AS100's /19 address block
- AS100 announces customers' individual networks to the Internet

## Aggregation – Bad Example


#### Customer link goes down

- Their /23 network becomes unreachable
- /23 is withdrawn from AS100's IBGP
- Their service provider doesn't aggregate its /19 network block
  - /23 network withdrawal announced to peers
  - Starts rippling through the Internet
  - Added load on all Internet backbone routers as network is removed from routing table

#### Customer link returns

- Their /23 network is now visible to their provider
- Their /23 network is re-advertised to peers
- Starts rippling through Internet
- Load on Internet backbone routers as network is reinserted into routing table
- Some service providers suppress the flaps
- Internet may take 10-20 min or longer to be visible
- Where is the Quality of Service???

## Aggregation – Example



- Customer has /23 network assigned from AS100's /19 address block
- AS100 announced /19 aggregate to the Internet

## Aggregation – Good Example

#### Customer link goes down

- Their /23 network becomes unreachable
- /23 is withdrawn from AS100's IBGP
- /19 aggregate is still being announced
  - No BGP hold down problems
  - No BGP propagation delays
  - No damping by other network operators

- →□ Customer link returns
  - Their /23 network is visible again
    - The /23 is re-injected into AS100's IBGP
  - The whole Internet becomes visible immediately
  - Customer has Quality of Service perception

## Aggregation – Summary

#### □ Good example is what everyone should do!

- Adds to Internet stability
- Reduces size of routing table
- Reduces routing churn
- Improves Internet QoS for everyone
- Bad example is what too many still do!
  - Why? Lack of knowledge?
  - Laziness?

## Separation of IBGP and EBGP

- Many network operators do not understand the importance of separating IBGP and EBGP
  - IBGP is where all customer prefixes are carried
  - EBGP is used for announcing aggregate to Internet and for Traffic Engineering
- Do NOT do traffic engineering with customer originated IBGP prefixes
  - Leads to instability similar to that mentioned in the earlier bad example
  - Even though aggregate is announced, a flapping subprefix will lead to instability for the customer concerned

Generate traffic engineering prefixes on the Border Router

## The Internet Today (June 2023)

#### Current IPv4 Internet Routing Table Statistics

BGP Routing Table Entries	925195
Prefixes after maximum aggregation	350380
Unique prefixes in Internet	450399
/24s announced	555542
ASNs in use	74484

- (maximum aggregation is calculated by Origin AS)
- (unique prefixes > max aggregation means that operators are announcing prefixes from their blocks without a covering aggregate)

## The Internet Today (June 2023)

#### Current IPv6 Internet Routing Table Statistics

BGP Routing Table Entries	174464
/48s announced	85690
ASNs in use	30968

### Efforts to improve aggregation

#### □ The CIDR Report

- Initiated and operated for many years by Tony Bates
- Now combined with Geoff Huston's routing analysis
  - www.cidr-report.org
  - covers both IPv4 and IPv6 BGP tables)
- Results e-mailed on a weekly basis to most operations lists around the world
- Lists the top 30 service providers who could do better at aggregating
- RIPE Routing WG aggregation recommendations
  - IPv4: RIPE-399 www.ripe.net/ripe/docs/ripe-399.html
  - IPv6: RIPE-532 www.ripe.net/ripe/docs/ripe-532.html


## Efforts to Improve Aggregation The CIDR Report

- Also computes the size of the routing table assuming network operators performed optimal aggregation
- Website allows searches and computations of aggregation to be made on a per AS basis
  - Flexible and powerful tool to aid network operators
  - Intended to show how greater efficiency in terms of BGP table size can be obtained without loss of routing and policy information
  - Shows what forms of origin AS aggregation could be performed and the potential benefit of such actions to the total table size
  - Very effectively challenges the traffic engineering excuse

#### **Status Summary**

#### **Table History**


Date	Prefixes	<b>CIDR Aggregated</b>
29-05-2	<b>3</b> 929723	515436
30-05-2	<b>3</b> 929816	515170
31-05-2	<b>3</b> 929921	515773
01-06-2	<b>3</b> 929771	515579
02-06-2	<b>3</b> 929783	516013
03-06-2	<b>3</b> 930046	515775
04-06-2	<b>3</b> 929978	516038
05-06-2	<b>3</b> 929975	515775



Plot: BGP Table Size

#### **AS Summary**

- 74591 Number of ASes in routing system
- <sup>26450</sup> Number of ASes announcing only one prefix
- <sup>11368</sup> Largest number of prefixes announced by an AS AS8151: Uninet S.A. de C.V., MX
- <sup>228722688</sup> Largest address span announced by an AS (/32s) AS749: DNIC-AS-00749, US



Plot: AS count

Plot: Average announcements per origin AS

Report: ASes ordered by originating address span

Report: ASes ordered by transit address span

Report: Autonomous System number-to-name mapping (from Registry WHOIS data)

RankASTypeOriginate Addr Space (pfx)Transit Addr space (pfx)Description84AS6389ORG+TRN Originate:8674816 /8.95Transit:54528 /16.27BELLSOUTH-NET-BLK, US

#### **Aggregation Suggestions**

Filter: Aggregates, Specifics

This report does not take into account conditions local to each origin AS in terms of policy or traffic engineering requirements, so this is an approximate guideline as to aggregation 1

Rank AS 92 <u>AS6389</u>	AS Name Current Wthdw Aggte Annce Redctn % BELLSOUTH-NET-BLK, US 662 558 7 111 551 83.23%	
Prefix	AS Path Aggregation Suggestion	
12.81.120.0/24	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389	
12.130.209.0/24	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 6389 6389 6389	
65.5.0.0/16	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389	
65.5.64.0/22	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.5.0.0/16 4777 2516 1299 7018 6	
65.5.118.0/23	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.5.0.0/16 4777 2516 1299 7018 6	389
65.5.160.0/22	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.5.0.0/16 4777 2516 1299 7018 6	389
65.5.164.0/22	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.5.0.0/16 4777 2516 1299 7018 6	389
65.5.172.0/22	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.5.0.0/16 4777 2516 1299 7018 6	389
65.5.200.0/21	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.5.0.0/16 4777 2516 1299 7018 6	389
65.5.228.0/22	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.5.0.0/16 4777 2516 1299 7018 6	389
65.5.232.0/22	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.5.0.0/16 4777 2516 1299 7018 6	389
65.5.236.0/22	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.5.0.0/16 4777 2516 1299 7018 6	389
65.5.240.0/22	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.5.0.0/16 4777 2516 1299 7018 6	389
65.5.244.0/22	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.5.0.0/16 4777 2516 1299 7018 6	389
65.5.248.0/22	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.5.0.0/16 4777 2516 1299 7018 6	389
65.5.252.0/22	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.5.0.0/16 4777 2516 1299 7018 6	389
65.6.0.0/15	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389	
65.6.192.0/22	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.6.0.0/15 4777 2516 1299 7018 6	389
65.6.196.0/22	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.6.0.0/15 4777 2516 1299 7018 6	389
65.7.64.0/18	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389	
65.12.0.0/14	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389	
65.12.32.0/20	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.12.0.0/14 4777 2516 1299 7018	6389
65.13.84.0/22	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.12.0.0/14 4777 2516 1299 7018	6389
65.13.92.0/22	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.12.0.0/14 4777 2516 1299 7018	6389
65.13.120.0/22	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.12.0.0/14 4777 2516 1299 7018	6389
65.13.124.0/22	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.12.0.0/14 4777 2516 1299 7018	6389
65.13.136.0/22	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.12.0.0/14 4777 2516 1299 7018	6389
65.13.176.0/21	4777 2516 1299 7018 6389 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 65.12.0.0/14 4777 2516 1299 7018	6389

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Long term deaggregator

- BellSouth in the US

RankASTypeOriginate Addr Space (pfx)Transit Addr space (pfx)Description303AS18566ORIGIN Originate:1710592 /11.29Transit:0 /0.00MEGAPATH5-, US

#### **Aggregation Suggestions**

Filter: Aggregates, Specifics

This report does not take into account conditions local to each origin AS in terms of policy or traffic engineering requirements, so this is an approximate guideline as to aggregation 1

Rank AS 34 <u>AS18566</u>	AS Name MEGAPATH5-, US	Current Wthdw Aggte Annce Redctn % 1852 1467 267 652 1200 64.79%
Prefix	AS Path	Aggregation Suggestion
64.6.160.0/23	4777 2516 3257 18	566
64.6.164.0/22	4777 2516 3257 18	566 + Announce - aggregate of 64.6.164.0/23 (4777 2516 3257 18566) and 64.6.166.0/23 (4777 2516 3257 18566)
64.6.164.0/23	4777 2516 3257 18	566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.6.166.0/23 (4777 2516 3257 18566)
64.6.166.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18	566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.6.167.0/24 (4777 2516 3257 18566)
64.6.167.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18	566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.6.166.0/24 (4777 2516 3257 18566)
64.50.206.0/23	4777 2516 3257 18	566
64.51.126.0/23	4777 2516 3257 18	566
64.81.16.0/20	4777 2516 3257 18	566 + Announce - aggregate of 64.81.16.0/21 (4777 2516 3257 18566) and 64.81.24.0/21 (4777 2516 3257 18566)
64.81.16.0/22	4777 2516 3257 18	566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.81.20.0/22 (4777 2516 3257 18566)
64.81.20.0/22	4777 2516 3257 18	566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.81.16.0/22 (4777 2516 3257 18566)
64.81.22.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18	566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.20.0/22 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.24.0/22	4777 2516 3257 18	566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.81.28.0/22 (4777 2516 3257 18566)
64.81.28.0/22	4777 2516 3257 18	566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.81.24.0/22 (4777 2516 3257 18566)
64.81.32.0/19	4777 2516 3257 18	566 + Announce - aggregate of 64.81.32.0/20 (4777 2516 3257 18566) and 64.81.48.0/20 (4777 2516 3257 18566)
64.81.32.0/20	4777 2516 3257 18	566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.81.48.0/20 (4777 2516 3257 18566)
64.81.32.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18	566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.32.0/20 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.33.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18	566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.32.0/20 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.34.0/24	4777 2516 3257 18	566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.32.0/20 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.39.0/24		566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.32.0/20 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.40.0/24		566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.32.0/20 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.44.0/24		566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.32.0/20 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.48.0/20		566 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 64.81.32.0/20 (4777 2516 3257 18566)
64.81.48.0/24		566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.48.0/20 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.50.0/24		566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.48.0/20 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.53.0/24		566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.48.0/20 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.57.0/24		566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.48.0/20 4777 2516 3257 18566 31
64.81.60.0/24		566 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 64.81.48.0/20 4777 2516 3257 18566
64.81.64.0/19	4777 2516 3257 18	566 + Announce - aggregate of 64.81.64.0/20 (4777 2516 3257 18566) and 64.81.80.0/20 (4777 2516 3257 18566)

Long term deaggregator – Megapath in the US

Rank AS Type Originate Addr Space (pfx) Transit Addr space (pfx) Description 145 AS7545 ORG+TRN Originate: 5190656 /9.69 Transit: 7385344 /9.18 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU

#### **Aggregation Suggestions**

Filter: Aggregates, Specifics

#### Long term deaggregator – TPG in Australia

This report does not take into account conditions local to each origin AS in terms of policy or traffic engineering requirements, so this is an approximate guideline as to aggregation p

Rank AS 4 <u>AS7545</u>	AS Name TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG	Current Wthdw Aggte Annce Redctn % Telecom Limited, AU 5723 5174 162 711 5012 87.58%
Prefix	AS Path	Aggregation Suggestion
14.2.0.0/17	4608 7575 7545	+ Announce - aggregate of 14.2.0.0/18 (4608 7575 7545) and 14.2.64.0/18 (4608 7575 7545)
14.2.0.0/19	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.2.32.0/19 (4608 7575 7545)
14.2.32.0/19	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.2.0.0/19 (4608 7575 7545)
14.2.32.0/21	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.2.32.0/19 4608 7575 7545
14.2.40.0/21	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.2.32.0/19 4608 7575 7545
14.2.48.0/21	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.2.32.0/19 4608 7575 7545
14.2.56.0/21	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.2.32.0/19 4608 7575 7545
14.2.64.0/19	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - aggregated with 14.2.96.0/19 (4608 7575 7545)
14.2.96.0/19	4608 7575 7545	– Withdrawn – aggregated with 14.2.64.0/19 (4608 7575 7545)
14.2.128.0/18	4608 7575 7545	
14.2.192.0/20	4608 7575 7545	
14.200.0.0/14	4608 7575 7545	
14.200.1.0/24	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.200.0.0/14 4608 7575 7545
14.200.2.0/24	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.200.0.0/14 4608 7575 7545
14.200.4.0/24	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.200.0.0/14 4608 7575 7545
14.200.5.0/24	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.200.0.0/14 4608 7575 7545
14.200.6.0/24	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.200.0.0/14 4608 7575 7545
14.200.7.0/24	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.200.0.0/14 4608 7575 7545
14.200.8.0/24	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.200.0.0/14 4608 7575 7545
14.200.10.0/24	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.200.0.0/14 4608 7575 7545
14.200.11.0/24	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.200.0.0/14 4608 7575 7545
14.200.12.0/24	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.200.0.0/14 4608 7575 7545
14.200.13.0/24	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.200.0.0/14 4608 7575 7545
14.200.14.0/24	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.200.0.0/14 4608 7575 7545
14.200.15.0/24	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.200.0.0/14 4608 7575 7545
14.200.16.0/24	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.200.0.0/14 4608 7575 7545
14.200.17.0/24	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.200.0.0/14 4608 7575 7545
14.200.18.0/24	4608 7575 7545	- Withdrawn - matching aggregate 14.200.0.0/14 4608 7575 7545

RankASTypeOriginate Addr Space (pfx)Transit Addr space (pfx)Description58AS12479ORG+TRN Originate:13940992 /8.27Transit:340480 /13.62UNI2-AS, ES

#### **Aggregation Suggestions**

Filter: Aggregates, Specifics

This report does not take into account conditions local to each origin AS in terms of policy or traffic engineering requirements, so this is an approximate guideline as to aggregation r

Rank AS 12 <u>AS12479</u>	AS Name UNI2-AS, ES	Current Wthdw Aggte Annce Redctn % 7301 4029 936 4208 3093 42.36%
Prefix	AS Path	Aggregation Suggestion
1.178.224.0/19	4608 1221 4637 55	
1.178.224.0/21	4777 2516 1299 55	11 12479
1.178.232.0/21	4608 1221 4637 55	11 12479 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 1.178.224.0/19 4608 1221 4637 5511 12479
1.178.240.0/20	4777 2516 1299 55	11 12479 + Announce - aggregate of 1.178.240.0/21 (4777 2516 1299 5511 12479) and 1.178.248.0/21 (4777 2516 1
1.178.240.0/21	4777 2516 1299 55	11 12479 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 1.178.248.0/21 (4777 2516 1299 5511 12479)
1.178.248.0/21	4777 2516 1299 55	11 12479 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 1.178.240.0/21 (4777 2516 1299 5511 12479)
37.11.0.0/16	4608 7575 6461 55	11 12479
37.11.0.0/21	4777 2516 1299 55	11 12479 + Announce - aggregate of 37.11.0.0/22 (4777 2516 1299 5511 12479) and 37.11.4.0/22 (4777 2516 1299
37.11.0.0/22	4777 2516 1299 55	11 12479 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 37.11.4.0/22 (4777 2516 1299 5511 12479)
37.11.4.0/22		11 12479 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 37.11.0.0/22 (4777 2516 1299 5511 12479)
37.11.8.0/22	4608 7575 6461 55	11 12479 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 37.11.0.0/16 4608 7575 6461 5511 12479
37.11.12.0/22	4777 2516 1299 55	11 12479
37.11.16.0/22	4608 1221 4637 55	11 12479
37.11.20.0/22	4608 7575 6461 55	11 12479 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 37.11.0.0/16 4608 7575 6461 5511 12479
37.11.24.0/21		11 12479 + Announce - aggregate of 37.11.24.0/22 (4777 2516 1299 5511 12479) and 37.11.28.0/22 (4777 2516 129
37.11.24.0/22		11 12479 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 37.11.28.0/22 (4777 2516 1299 5511 12479)
37.11.28.0/22		11 12479 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 37.11.24.0/22 (4777 2516 1299 5511 12479)
37.11.32.0/22		11 12479 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 37.11.0.0/16 4608 7575 6461 5511 12479
37.11.36.0/22		11 12479 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 37.11.0.0/16 4608 7575 6461 5511 12479
37.11.40.0/21		11 12479 + Announce - aggregate of 37.11.40.0/22 (4777 2516 1299 5511 12479) and 37.11.44.0/22 (4777 2516 129
37.11.40.0/22		11 12479 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 37.11.44.0/22 (4777 2516 1299 5511 12479)
37.11.44.0/22		11 12479 - Withdrawn - aggregated with 37.11.40.0/22 (4777 2516 1299 5511 12479)
37.11.48.0/22	4777 2516 1299 55	
37.11.52.0/22		11 12479 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 37.11.0.0/16 4608 7575 6461 5511 12479
37.11.56.0/23		11 12479 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 37.11.0.0/16 4608 7575 6461 5511 12479 33
37.11.58.0/23		11 12479 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 37.11.0.0/16 4608 7575 6461 5511 12479
37.11.60.0/22		11 12479 - Withdrawn - matching aggregate 37.11.0.0/16 4608 7575 6461 5511 12479
37.11.64.0/22	4777 2516 1299 55	11 12479

Long term deaggregator – Orange in Spain

## Importance of Aggregation

- Size of routing table
  - Router Memory is not so much of a problem as it was in the 1990s
  - Routers routinely carry over 2 million prefixes
- Convergence of the Routing System
  - This is a problem
  - Bigger table takes longer for CPU to process
  - BGP updates take longer to deal with
  - BGP Instability Report tracks routing system update activity
  - bgpupdates.potaroo.net/instability/bgpupd.html

#### **The BGP Instability Report**

The BGP Instability Report is updated daily. This report was generated on 04 June 2023 06:20 (UTC+1000)

#### 50 Most active ASes for the past 14 days

RANK	ASN	UPDs	%	Prefixes	UPDs/Prefix	AS NAME
1	9381	330481	3.72%	535	617.72	HKBNES-AS-AP HKBN Enterprise Solutions HK Limited, HK
2	16509	245727	2.77%	8586	28.62	AMAZON-02, US
3	8151	143443	1.61%	11448	12.53	Uninet S.A. de C.V., MX
4	399077	102133	1.15%	539	189.49	TERAEXCH, US
5	9829	87139	0.98%	1924	45.29	BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone, IN
6	11830	67801	0.76%	2273	29.83	Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y Telecom., CR
7	7552	63105	0.71%	3618	17.44	VIETEL-AS-AP Viettel Group, VN
8	55577	61026	0.69%	91	670.62	BEAMTELE-AS-AP Atria Convergence Technologies pvt ltd, IN
9	647	60136	0.68%	370	162.53	DNIC-ASBLK-00616-00665, US
10	7713	56448	0.64%	3574	15.79	TELKOMNET-AS-AP PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia, ID
11	18403	52314	0.59%	4252	12.30	FPT-AS-AP FPT Telecom Company, VN
12	36903	51710	0.58%	1242	41.63	MT-MPLS, MA
13	13977	51117	0.58%	887	57.63	CTELCO, US
14	58224	50221	0.57%	2150	23.36	TCI, IR
15	23666	50004	0.56%	49	1020.49	SISTELINDO-AS-ID PT Sistelindo Mitralintas, ID
16	21575	48509	0.55%	169	287.04	ENTEL PERU S.A., PE
17	10620	45595	0.51%	3524	12.94	Telmex Colombia S.A., CO
18	203214	38504	0.43%	997	38.62	HULUMTELE, IQ
19	18209	36561	0.41%	129	283.42	BEAMTELE-AS-AP Atria Convergence Technologies pvt ltd, IN
20	38322	34913	0.39%	86	405.97	TTSSB-MY TM TECHNOLOGY SERVICES SDN. BHD., MY
21	53135	34168	0.38%	89		BRASIL TECNOLOGIA E PARTICIPACOES SA, BR
22	265566	33106	0.37%	4	8276.50	TELESISTEMAS PENINSULARES SA DE CV, MX
23	266407	31818	0.36%	1	31818.00	ASSEMBLEIA LEGISLATIVA DO ESTADO DE GOIAS, BR
24	6364	31405	0.35%	48		ATLANTIC-NET-1, US
25	8007	30434	0.34%	32	951.06	Servicios Administrados Mexis, S.A. de C.V., MX
26	28135	30385	0.34%	66	460.38	ASSOCIACAO NACIONAL PARA INCLUSAO DIGITAL - ANID, BR

#### 50 Most active Prefixes for the past 14 days

RANK	PREFIX	UPDs	%	Origin AS AS NAME
1	45.172.92.0/22	33003	0.36%	265566 TELESISTEMAS PENINSULARES SA DE CV, MX
2	170.238.225.0/24	31818	0.34%	266407 ASSEMBLEIA LEGISLATIVA DO ESTADO DE GOIAS, BR
3	69.28.87.0/24	31137	0.34%	6364 ATLANTIC-NET-1, US
4	207.249.70.0/24	30374	0.33%	8007 Servicios Administrados Mexis, S.A. de C.V., MX
5	177.46.7.0/24	27701	0.30%	28135 ASSOCIACAO NACIONAL PARA INCLUSAO DIGITAL - ANID, BR
6	67.211.53.0/24	24031	0.26%	26405 HDCS, US
7	142.67.31.0/24	23118	0.25%	22636 NOVA-SCOTIA-POWER, CA
8	12.129.82.0/24	22679	0.25%	40631 MASTEC-PRIVATE, US
9	185.96.215.0/24	22115	0.24%	200770 REQUISIS-AS requisis.com, DE
10	103.248.132.0/22	21689		132829 NCPL-AS-AP Nevigate Communications S Pte Ltd, SG
11	186.219.224.0/22	21686	0.23%	270598 FUSION INTERNET WIFI LTDA, BR
12	45.183.178.0/24	18345	0.20%	270142 Castor Networks Mexico s de rl, MX
13	195.13.50.0/24	15496	0.17%	58319 KAZAKOV-AS, RU
14	103.223.2.0/24	13983		135445 IDNIC-AIRPAY-AS-ID PT. Airpay International Indonesia, ID
	209.22.66.0/24	13503		2046 DNIC-AS-02046, US
16	209.22.67.0/24	13495	0.15%	2046 DNIC-AS-02046, US
	41.209.0.0/18	12628		9129 KE-NET2000, ZA
18	193.232.56.0/24	12468		50276 MUCTR, RU
19	193.232.57.0/24	12447	0.13%	50276 MUCTR, RU
20	27.131.0.0/24	12407		38753 SOLUSINDO-AS-ID Solusindo Bintang Pratama, PT, ID
21	187.251.64.0/19	12213		18592 Corporacion Universitaria para el Desarrollo de Internet, A.C., MX
22	200.23.60.0/24	12186		18592 Corporacion Universitaria para el Desarrollo de Internet, A.C., MX
	181.225.48.0/24	11952		8053 IFX Networks Venezuela C.A., VE
	181.225.43.0/24	11688		8053 IFX Networks Venezuela C.A., VE
	85.187.16.0/24	11629		203182 DIGITURK-, BG
26	135.84.68.0/24	10297		17289 USG-PROD-WEST01, US 397133 USG-NPE-WEST01, US
27	185.18.201.0/24	9559	0.10%	47855 PRIME Moscow branch, RU
28	207.244.192.0/22	9467	0.10%	6428 CDM, US
29	130.137.108.0/24	8692	0.09%	16509 AMAZON-02, US
30	130.137.227.0/24	8461	0.09%	16509 AMAZON-02, US
31	130.137.111.0/24	8454	0.09%	16509 AMAZON-02, US

#### The BGP IPv6 Instability Report

This report is updated daily. The current report was generated on 5 June 2023 01:10 (UTC+1000)

#### 50 Most active ASes for the past 14 days

RANK	ASN	UPDs	%	Prefixes	UPDs/Prefix	AS NAME
1	202256	265579	7.08%	2886	92.02	LAWLIETNET, CN
2	<u>7602</u>	190326	5.07%	12	15860.50	SPT-AS-VN Sai gon Postel Corporation, VN
3	<u>38266</u>	186776	4.98%	1301	143.56	VIL-AS-AP Vodafone Idea Ltd, IN
4	<u>18403</u>	183905	4.90%	4314	42.63	FPT-AS-AP FPT Telecom Company, VN
5	<u>11172</u>	129918	3.46%	5517	23.55	Alestra, S. de R.L. de C.V., MX
6	<u>20473</u>	102960	2.75%	857	120.14	AS-CHOOPA, US
7	<u>272605</u>	77974	2.08%	18	4331.89	G4 FIBRA, BR
8	<u>53667</u>	75847	2.02%	1929	39.32	PONYNET, US
9	<u>28573</u>	63515	1.69%	1899	33.45	Claro NXT Telecomunicacoes Ltda, BR
10	<u>134326</u>	58679	1.56%	16	3667.44	AIRDESIGNBROADCAST-AS Airdesign Broadcast Media Pvt Ltd, IN
11	<u>32098</u>	56566	1.51%	1361	41.56	TRANSTELCO-INC, US
12	<u>9829</u>	45274	1.21%	516	87.74	BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone, IN
13	<u>263499</u>	39620	1.06%	3	13206.67	Telecom Conectividade, BR
14	<u>212034</u>	37377	1.00%	10	3737.70	scirnet.com research net, CA
15	<u>264525</u>	36492	0.97%	23	1586.61	Coelho Tecnologia, BR
16	<u>19180</u>	35499	0.95%	1	35499.00	AMERICATEL PERU S.A., PE
17	<u>205610</u>	31697	0.85%	8	3962.12	JAMESITS Jamesits Networks , CN
18	<u>61637</u>	31312	0.83%	31	1010.06	RADIOBRAS TELECOM LTDA ME, BR
19	<u>210384</u>	29912	0.80%	9	3323.56	KUDOS-AS, TW
	<u>13780</u>	28201	0.75%	10	2820.10	MILEHIGHWALRUS-NETWORK, US
21	<u>48695</u>	27985	0.75%	1		ATHEEB-AS, SA
	<u>7552</u>	27452	0.73%	2202	12.47	VIETEL-AS-AP Viettel Group, VN
	<u>5385</u>	26817	0.71%	I		RUSSMEDIA-IT, AT
	<u>7545</u>	26330	0.70%	I		TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU
	<u>270326</u>	22239	0.59%	I		LUKAS S. FREITAS ME, BR
	<u>200952</u>	21803	0.58%			BARATA, PT
27	<u>16509</u>	20675	0.55%	3564	5.80	AMAZON-02, US

#### 50 Most active Prefixes for the past 14 days

RANK	PREFIX	UPDs	%	Origin AS AS NAME
1	2001:1380:2000::/36	35499	0.87%	19180 AMERICATEL PERU S.A., PE
2	2a0a:2f40::/32	26806	0.65%	5385 RUSSMEDIA-IT, AT
3	2804:20fc:1b00::/48	19938	0.49%	264525 Coelho Tecnologia, BR
4	2804:12cc::/33	19798	0.48%	263499 Telecom Conectividade, BR
5	2804:12cc:8000::/33	19742	0.48%	263499 Telecom Conectividade, BR
6	2402:f800::/32	16709	0.41%	7602 SPT-AS-VN Sai gon Postel Corporation, VN
7	2a0b:4340:99::/48	15848	0.39%	205610 JAMESITS Jamesits Networks , CN
8	2a0b:4340:90::/48	15822	0.39%	205610 JAMESITS Jamesits Networks , CN
9	2402:f800:ff00::/40	15796	0.39%	7602 SPT-AS-VN Sai gon Postel Corporation, VN
	2402:f800:cf00::/48	15796	0.39%	7602 SPT-AS-VN Sai gon Postel Corporation, VN
11	2402:f800:ef00::/40	15794		7602 SPT-AS-VN Sai gon Postel Corporation, VN
12	2402:f800:cf00::/40	15788		7602 SPT-AS-VN Sai gon Postel Corporation, VN
	<u>2402:f800::/40</u>	15787		7602 SPT-AS-VN Sai gon Postel Corporation, VN
-	2402:f800:df00::/40	15787	0.39%	7602 SPT-AS-VN Sai gon Postel Corporation, VN
15	2402:f800::/48	15782		7602 SPT-AS-VN Sai gon Postel Corporation, VN
16	2402:f800:ffff::/48	15781		7602 SPT-AS-VN Sai gon Postel Corporation, VN
	2402:f800:df00::/48	15779	0.39%	7602 SPT-AS-VN Sai gon Postel Corporation, VN
18	2402:f800:ef00::/48	15772		7602 SPT-AS-VN Sai gon Postel Corporation, VN
19	2402:f800:ff00::/48	15755		7602 SPT-AS-VN Sai gon Postel Corporation, VN
20	2400:58a0:1800::/44	15201		150404 THUNDER-AS-AP Thunder Network Limited, HK
-	2a0a:6040:e6ff::/48	14959		200882 SAHIL-S-NETWORK, US
22	2a06:a001:a108::/48	14936		<u> 210384 KUDOS-AS, TW</u>
23	2404:f4c0:8868::/48	14914		<u> 210384 KUDOS-AS, TW</u>
	2804:2000:1fff::/48	14654		264459 NET ALTERNATIVA PROVEDOR DE INTERNET LTDA - ME, BR
25	2a0a:6040:c742::/48	14402		212164 HE-AS Kakan Network, CN
	2a0a:afc7::/48	13882		201196 BERMOND-AS, VG
27	2602:feda:d64::/48	13765		212034 scirnet.com research net, CA
	2406:840:f895::/48	13394		212034 scirnet.com research net, CA
	2a03:5a00:d::/48	12725		<u>58319 KAZAKOV-AS, RU</u>
30	<u>2804:7160::/32</u>	12500		270785 PRNET PROVEDOR DE INTERNET LTDA, BR
31	2a0e:fd45:bee::/48	12352	0.30%	139921 UNIXFY-AS Unixfy, SG

#### Aggregation: Summary

- Aggregation on the Internet could be MUCH better
  - 50% saving on Internet routing table size is quite feasible
  - Tools are available
  - Commands on the routers are not hard
  - CIDR-Report webpage

# Receiving Prefixes

#### **Receiving Prefixes**

- There are three scenarios for receiving prefixes from other ASes
  - Customer talking BGP
  - Peer talking BGP
  - Upstream/Transit talking BGP
- Each has different filtering requirements and need to be considered separately

- Network Operators must only accept prefixes which have been assigned or allocated to their downstream customer
- If the Network Operator has assigned address space to its customer, then the customer IS entitled to announce it back to their provider
- If the Network Operator has NOT assigned address space to its customer, then:
  - Check in the five RIR databases to see if this address space really has been assigned to the customer
  - The tool: whois -h jwhois.apnic.net x.x.x.0/24
    - (jwhois is "joint whois" and queries the 5 RIR databases)

Example use of whois to check if customer is entitled to announce address space:
inetnum – means it is an

address delegation to an entity

\$ whois -h jwhois.ap<del>ni</del>c.net 202.12.29.0

inetnum:	202.12.29.0 - 202.12.29.255					
netname:	APNIC-SERVICES-AU					
descr:	Asia Pacific Network Information Centre					
descr:	Regional Internet Registry for the Asia-Pacific Region					
descr:	6 Cordelia Street					
descr:	South Brisbane					
geoloc:	27.4731138 153.0141194	Portable – means its an				
country:	AU	assignment to the customer, the				
admin-c:	AIC1-AP	customer can announce it to you				
tech-c:	AIC1-AP	,				
mnt-by:	APNIC-HM					
mnt-irt:	IRT-APNIC-IS-AP					
status:	ASSIGNED PORTABLE					
changed:	hm-changed@apnic.net 20170327					
changed:	hm-changed@apnic.net 20170331					
source:	APNIC					

Example use of whois to check if customer is entitled to announce address space:

inetnum: 194.15.141.0 - 194.15.141.255	Assigned PI – means its an
InstantINETTECHnetname:INETTECHcountry:SEorg:ORG-ITAS2-RIPEadmin-c:KEL5-RIPEtech-c:KEL5-RIPEstatus:ASSIGNED PImnt-by:RIPE-NCC-END-MNTmnt-by:KURTIS-PP-MNTmnt-routes:KURTIS-PP-MNTmnt-domains:KURTIS-PP-MNTcreated:2003-12-04T09:33:09Zlast-modified:2016-04-14T08:21:55Zsource:RIPEsponsoring-org:ORG-NIE1-RIPE	assignment to the customer, the customer can announce it to you

Example use of whois to check if customer is entitled to announce address space:

\$ whois -h jwho	ois.apnic.net 193.128.0.0/	22	address deleg	pation to an ent	ity
<pre>inetnum: netname: country: org: admin-c: tech-c: status: remarks: mnt-by: mnt-by:</pre>	193.128.0.0 - 193.128.6. UK-PIPEX-19931014 GB ORG-UA24-RIPE WERT1-RIPE UPHM1-RIPE ALLOCATED PA Please send abuse notific RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT AS1849-MNT		se@uk.uu.net		
<pre>mnt-routes: mnt-routes: mnt-irt: created: last-modified: source:</pre>	AS1849-MNT WCOM-EMEA-RICE-MNT IRT-MCI-GB 2018-07-30T09:42:04Z 2018-07-30T09:42:04Z RIPE # Filtered	Provider Age space and ca by the service	<ul> <li>means that gregatable add an only be ann ce provider ho n this case Ver</li> </ul>	ress nounced Iding the	

### Receiving Prefixes from customer: Cisco IOS

■ For Example:

- Downstream has 100.69.0.0/20 block
- Should only announce this to upstreams
- Upstreams should only accept this from them
- Configuration on upstream

```
router bgp 100
address-family ipv4
neighbor 100.67.10.1 remote-as 101
neighbor 100.67.10.1 prefix-list customer in
neighbor 100.67.10.1 prefix-list default out
neighbor 100.67.10.1 activate
!
ip prefix-list customer permit 100.69.0.0/20
!
ip prefix-list default permit 0.0.0.0/0
```

### Receiving Prefixes: From Peers

- A peer is a Network Operator with whom you agree to exchange prefixes you originate into the Internet routing table
  - Prefixes you accept from a peer are only those they have indicated they will announce
  - Prefixes you announce to your peer are only those you have indicated you will announce

### Receiving Prefixes: From Peers

Agreeing what each will announce to the other:

 Exchange of e-mail documentation as part of the peering agreement, and then ongoing updates

#### OR

- Use of the Internet Routing Registry and configuration tools such as:
  - IRRToolSet:

https://github.com/irrtoolset/irrtoolset

#### bgpq4:

https://github.com/bgp/bgpq4

### Receiving Prefixes from peer: Cisco IOS

- For Example:
  - Peer has 220.50.0.0/16, 61.237.64.0/18 and 81.250.128.0/17 address blocks
- Configuration on local router

```
router bgp 100
address-family ipv4
neighbor 100.67.10.1 remote-as 101
neighbor 100.67.10.1 prefix-list my-peer in
neighbor 100.67.10.1 prefix-list my-prefix out
neighbor 100.67.10.1 activate
!
ip prefix-list my-peer permit 220.50.0.0/16
ip prefix-list my-peer permit 61.237.64.0/18
ip prefix-list my-peer permit 81.250.128.0/17
ip prefix-list my-peer deny 0.0.0.0/0 le 32
!
ip prefix-list my-prefix permit 100.67.16.0/20
```

- Upstream/Transit Provider is a Network Operator who you pay to give you transit to the WHOLE Internet
- Receiving prefixes from them is not desirable unless really necessary
  - Traffic Engineering see BGP Multihoming presentations
- Ask upstream/transit provider to either:
  - originate a default-route

#### OR

announce one prefix you can use as default

#### Downstream Router Configuration

```
router bgp 100
address-family ipv4
network 100.66.0.0 mask 255.255.224.0
neighbor 100.65.7.1 remote-as 101
neighbor 100.65.7.1 prefix-list infilter in
neighbor 100.65.7.1 prefix-list outfilter out
neighbor 100.65.7.1 activate
!
ip prefix-list infilter permit 0.0.0.0/0
!
ip prefix-list outfilter permit 100.66.0.0/19
```

#### Upstream Router Configuration

```
router bgp 101
address-family ipv4
neighbor 100.65.7.2 remote-as 100
neighbor 100.65.7.2 default-originate
neighbor 100.65.7.2 prefix-list cust-in in
neighbor 100.65.7.2 prefix-list cust-out out
neighbor 100.65.7.2 activate
!
ip prefix-list cust-in permit 100.66.0.0/19
!
ip prefix-list cust-out permit 0.0.0.0/0
```

- If it is necessary to receive prefixes from any provider, care is required.
  - Don't accept default (unless you need it)
  - Don't accept your own prefixes
- Special use prefixes for IPv4 and IPv6:
  - http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6890.txt

■ For IPv4:

- Don't accept prefixes longer than /24 (?)
  - /24 was the historical class C

□ For IPv6:

- Don't accept prefixes longer than /48 (?)
  - /48 is the design minimum delegated to a site

- Check Team Cymru's list of "bogons"
  - https://www.team-cymru.com/bogon-reference-http
- For IPv4 also consult:
  - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6441.txt (BCP171)
- Bogon Route Server:
  - https://www.team-cymru.com/bogon-reference-bgp
  - Supplies a BGP feed (IPv4 and/or IPv6) of address blocks which should not appear in the BGP table

#### Receiving IPv4 Prefixes

```
router bop 100
 network 101.10.0.0 mask 255.255.224.0
neighbor 100.65.7.1 remote-as 101
neighbor 100.65.7.1 prefix-list in-filter in
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 0.0.0.0/0
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 0.0.0.0/8 le 32
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 10.0.0.0/8 le 32
ip prefix-list in-filter denv 100.64.0.0/10 le 32
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 101.10.0.0/19 le 32
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 127.0.0.0/8 le 32
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 169.254.0.0/16 le 32
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 172.16.0.0/12 le 32
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 192.0.0.0/24 le 32
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 192.0.2.0/24 le 32
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 192.168.0.0/16 le 32
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 198.18.0.0/15 le 32
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 198.51.100.0/24 le 32 ! TEST2
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 203.0.113.0/24 le 32
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 224.0.0.0/3 le 32
ip prefix-list in-filter deny 0.0.0.0/0 ge 25
ip prefix-list in-filter permit 0.0.0.0/0 le 32
```

```
! Default
! RFC1122 local host
! RFC1918
! RFC6598 shared address
! Local prefix
! Loopback
! Auto-config
! RFC1918
! RFC1918
! RFC6598 IETF protocol
! TEST1
! RFC1918
! Benchmarking
! TEST2
! TEST3
! Multicast & Experimental
! Prefixes >/24
```

#### Receiving IPv6 Prefixes

```
router bgp 100
network 2020:3030::/32
neighbor 2020:3030::1 remote-as 101
neighbor 2020:3030::1 prefix-list v6in-filter in
1
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter permit 64:ff9b::/96
                                                           ! RFC6052 v4v6trans
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter deny 2001::/23 le 128
                                                           ! RFC2928 IETF prot
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter deny 2001:2::/48 le 128
                                                           ! Benchmarking
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter deny 2001:10::/28 le 128
                                                           ! ORCHID
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter deny 2001:db8::/32 le 128
                                                           ! Documentation
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter deny 2002::/16 le 128
                                                           ! Deny all 6to4
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter deny 2020:3030::/32 le 128
                                                           ! Local Prefix
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter deny 3ffe::/16 le 128
                                                           ! Formerly 6bone
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter permit 2000::/3 le 48
                                                           ! Global Unicast
ipv6 prefix-list v6in-filter deny ::/0 le 128
```

**Note**: These filters block Teredo (serious security risk) and 6to4 (deprecated by RFC7526)

#### **Receiving Prefixes**

- Paying attention to prefixes received from customers, peers and transit providers assists with:
  - The integrity of the local network
  - The integrity of the Internet
- Responsibility of all Network Operators to be good Internet citizens

# Receiving BGP attributes

#### Receiving BGP attributes

- BGP attributes are sent as part of the BGP updates for each prefix
- Common attributes operators need to be aware of, for routing best practice, are:
  - MED
  - AS numbers (only public ASNs are routable)
  - BGP Communities

#### Receiving Prefixes: MEDs?

- MEDs are used by EBGP neighbours to indicate preferred entry point into their network over two or more links with their neighbour
  - Allows the operator to determine entry path into their network
     Might have unintended consequences within their peer's network
  - Many operators will override MEDs attached to BGP announcements by setting their own local-preference values

#### Receiving Prefixes: Bogon ASNs?

What about prefixes originated by bogon AS numbers?

- Public ranges are 1-64495 (excluding 23456) and 131072-458751
  - IANA is distributing AS blocks to the RIRs from the latter range
- All other ASNs are either for documentation, or for private use, or are unassigned
  - And any prefixes originating from those need to be dropped
  - Configuration error? Malicious intent?
- What would the AS\_PATH filter look like?
  - Challenging with regular expression (as per IOS)
  - Easier with AS ranges (as per Bird or JunOS)

#### Filtering bogon ASNs – BIRD

Here is a function showing how to filter bogon ASNs, as described previously:

```
function as path contains bogons()
int set invalid asns;
{
   invalid asns = [
       Ο,
                               # Reserved
                               # Transition AS
       23456,
       64496..64511,
                               # Documentation ASNs
       64512..65534,
                               # Private ASNs
       65535,
                               # Reserved
                            # Documentation ASNs
       65536..65551,
       65552..131071, # Reserved
       458752..4199999999, # IANA Reserved
       420000000..4294967294, # Private ASNs
       4294967295
                               # Reserved
   ];
   return bgp path ~ invalid asns;
}
```

#### Filtering bogon ASNs – FRR

Here is an AS-PATH regexp showing how to filter bogon ASNs:

```
bgp as-path access-list Bogon ASNs deny 0
bgp as-path access-list Bogon ASNs deny 23456
bgp as-path access-list Bogon ASNs deny 6449[6-9]
bgp as-path access-list Bogon ASNs deny _64[5-9][0-9][0-9]
bgp as-path access-list Bogon ASNs deny 6[5-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]
bgp as-path access-list Bogon ASNs deny [7-9][0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]
bgp as-path access-list Bogon ASNs deny 1[0-2][0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]
bqp as-path access-list Boqon ASNs deny 130[0-9][0-9][0-9]
bgp as-path access-list Bogon ASNs deny 1310[0-6][0-9]
bgp as-path access-list Bogon ASNs deny 13107[0-1]
bgp as-path access-list Bogon ASNs deny 45875[2-9]
bgp as-path access-list Bogon ASNs deny 4587[6-9][0-9]
bgp as-path access-list Bogon ASNs deny 458[8-9][0-9][0-9]
bop as-path access-list Bogon ASNs deny 459[0-9][0-9][0-9]
bgp as-path access-list Bogon ASNs deny 4[6-9][0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]
bgp as-path access-list Bogon ASNs deny [5-9][0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]
bgp as-path access-list Bogon ASNs permit .*
```

#### Receiving Prefixes: BGP Communities?

- BGP communities are attached to BGP announcements to indicate:
  - Internal policy within an AS
  - External policy supported by a peer, for:
    - Onward routing policy/traffic engineering
    - Filtering (eg Remotely Triggered Blackhole Filtering)
    - Traffic engineering between the two networks
- Different BGP implementations have different default BGP community behaviours consult:
  - Vendor documentation
  - https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8642.txt for discussion of some of the issues operators need to be aware of

#### Receiving Prefixes: BGP Communities

#### Don't accept community values that are not expected

- Match expected values
- Overwrite received community values with your own default value

```
ip community-list standard lp-250 permit 65534:250
!
route-map ebgp-import permit 5
description Set high preference
match community lp-250
set local-preference 250
set community 65534:100
!
route-map ebgp-import permit 10
description Set our default community
set community 65534:100
!
Cisco IOS: this overwrites all
incoming community values
```

#### Receiving Prefixes: BGP Communities

- Don't send community values that are not needed by peer
  - This avoids propagating your internal communities to other networks



Propagate all communities within the AS (by IBGP)

This may need changes to your equipment's default!

#### Receiving BGP attributes

- Care is needed when receiving prefixes, to be aware of some of the optional BGP attributes that may be attached
  - BGP communities are only intended for policy decisions within an AS or between two peering ASes
  - MEDs may have unexpected consequences for traffic flows on the peer's network
  - Bogon ASNs, like bogon address space, must never be used or announced to the global Internet

## Prefixes into IBGP

### Injecting prefixes into IBGP

- Use IBGP to carry customer prefixes
  - Don't use IGP
- Point static route to customer interface
- Use BGP network statement
- As long as static route exists (interface active), prefix will be in BGP

#### Router Configuration: network statement

#### Example:

```
interface loopback 0
ip address 100.64.3.1 255.255.255.255
!
interface Serial 5/0
ip unnumbered loopback 0
ip verify unicast reverse-path
!
ip route 100.71.10.0 255.255.252.0 Serial 5/0
!
router bgp 100
address-family ipv4
network 100.71.10.0 mask 255.255.252.0
!
```

#### Injecting prefixes into IBGP

- Interface flap will result in prefix withdraw and reannounce
  - USE "ip route . . . permanent"
- Many network operators redistribute static routes into BGP rather than using the network statement
  - Only do this if you understand why

#### Router Configuration: redistribute static

#### Example:

```
ip route 100.71.10.0 255.255.252.0 Serial 5/0
!
router bgp 100
address-family ipv4
redistribute static route-map static-to-bgp
<snip>
!
route-map static-to-bgp permit 10
match ip address prefix-list ISP-block
set origin igp
set community 100:1000
<snip>
!
ip prefix-list ISP-block permit 100.71.10.0/22 le 30
```

## Injecting prefixes into IBGP

#### Route-map static-to-bgp can be used for many things:

- Setting communities and other attributes
- Setting origin code to IGP, etc

#### Be careful with prefix-lists and route-maps

 Absence of either/both means all statically routed prefixes go into IBGP

#### Summary

- Best Practices Covered:
  - When to use BGP
  - When to use ISIS/OSPF
  - Aggregation
  - Receiving Prefixes
  - Prefixes into BGP

## Interconnection Best Practices

#### PeeringDB and the Internet Routing Registry

#### Interconnection Best Practices

Types of Peering
Using the PeeringDB and IXPDB
Using the Internet Routing Registry

## Types of Peering (1)

#### Private Peering

 Where two network operators agree to interconnect their networks, and exchange their respective routes, for the purpose of ensuring their customers can reach each other directly over the peering link

#### Settlement Free Peering

- No traffic charges
- The most common form of peering
- Paid Peering
  - Where two operators agree to exchange traffic charges for a peering relationship

## Types of Peering (2)

- Bi-lateral Peering
  - Very similar to Private Peering, but usually takes place at a public peering point (IXP)
- Multilateral Peering
  - Takes place at Internet Exchange Points, where operators all peer with each other via a Route Server
- Mandatory Multilateral Peering
  - Where operators are forced to peer with each other as condition of IXP membership
  - Strongly discouraged: Has no record of success

## Types of Peering (3)

#### Open Peering

- Where a network operator publicly states that they will peer with all parties who approach them for peering
- Commonly found at IXPs where the network operator participates via the Route Server (RS)

#### Selective Peering

- Where a network operator's peering policy depends on the nature of the operator who requests peering with them
- At IXPs, the operator will not peer with RS but will only peer bilaterally
- Restrictive Peering
  - Where a network operator decides who its peering partners are, and is generally not approachable to considering peering opportunities

## Types of Peering (4)

- The Peering Database documents network operator peering policies
  - https://www.peeringdb.com
- All operators with an AS are recommended to register in the PeeringDB
  - All operators who are considering peering or are peering must be in the PeeringDB to enhance their peering opportunities
- Participation in peering fora is encouraged too
  - Global Peering Forum (GPF) (for North American peering)
  - Regional Peering Fora (European, Middle Eastern, Asian, Caribbean, Latin American)
  - Many countries now have their own Peering Fora

## Types of Peering (5)

- The IXPDB documents IXPs and their participants around the world
  - https://ixpdb.euro-ix.net/en/
- All Internet Exchange Point operators should register their IXP in the database
  - IXPs using IXP Manager will have this happen as part of the IXP Manager set up
  - Provides the LAN IP addresses of each member to facilitate automation





Search here for a network, IX, or facility.

Advanced Search

#### pfsinoz

HKIX

Organization	Hong Kong Internet eXchange Limited
Long Name	Hong Kong Internet Exchange
City	Hong Kong
Country	нк
Continental Region	Asia Pacific
Media Type	Ethernet
Protocols Supported	⊘ Unicast IPv4 ◯ Multicast ⊘ IPv6
Notes 😯	

#### **Contact Information**

Company Website	https://www.hkix.net/
Traffic Stats Website	https://www.hkix.net/hkix/stat/aggt/hkix-aggregate.html
Technical Email	noc@hkix.net
Technical Phone	+85239439900
Policy Email	info@hkix.net
Policy Phone	+85239438800

#### LAN

МТU	1500
DOT1Q	0
IPv6	2001:7fa:0:1::/64
IPv4	123.255.88.0/21

#### Local Facilities

Filter

Facility 🕶	Country	City
<u>CUHK</u>	Hong Kong	Hong Kong
MEGA Two (iAdvantage Hong Kong)	Hong Kong	Hong Kong
<u>MEGA-i (iAdvantage Hong Kong)</u>	Hong Kong	Hong Kong

Peers at this Exchange Point		lter
Peer Name <del>▼</del> ASN	IPv4 IPv6	Speed Policy
ASGCNET HKIX Peering LAN 24167	123.255.91.53 2001:7fa:0:1::ca28:a135	10G 5 Open
Asia Pacific Telecom HKIX Peering LAN 17709	123.255.91.86 2001:7fa:0:1::ca28:a156	10G Open
ASLINE HKIX Peering LAN 18013	123.255.92.13 2001:7fa:0:1::ca28:a20d	
<u>AT&amp;T AP - AS2687</u> HKIX Peering LAN 2687	123.255.91.46 2001:7fa:0:1::ca28:a12e	10G Selective
Automattic HKIX Peering LAN 2635	123.255.90.71 2001:7fa:0:1::ca28:a047	
Badoo Ltd HKIX Peering LAN 12678 Baidu HKIX Peering LAN	123.255.90.220 None 123.255.90.131	2G Open 10G
55967 Baidu HKIX Peering LAN	2001:7fa:0:1::ca28:a083 123.255.91.61	
55967 Bayan Telecommunications	2001:7fa:0:1::ca28:a13c 123.255.91.45	Den 3G
Inc. HKIX Peering LAN 6648	2001:7fa:0:1::ca28:a12c	
BGP Network Limited HKIX Peering LAN 64050	123.255.91.177 2001:7fa:0:1::ca28:a1b1	100G I Open
BIGHUB-ISP HKIX Peering LAN 137989 BIGHUB-ISP HKIX Peering LAN	123.255.90.207 2001:7fa:0:1::ca28:a0cf 123.255.91.98	1G Open 10G



Search here for a network, IX, or facility.

#### pfsinoz

Advanced Search

#### Amazon.com Diamond Sponsor

Organization	Amazon.com
Also Known As	Amazon Web Services
Company Website	http://www.amazon.com
Primary ASN	16509
IRR as-set/route-set 3	AS-AMAZON
Route Server URL	-
Looking Glass URL	-
Network Type	Enterprise
IPv4 Prefixes 🕄	5000 -
IPv6 Prefixes 3	2000
Traffic Levels	Not Disclosed -
Traffic Ratios	Balanced
Geographic Scope	Global
Protocols Supported	⊘ Unicast IPv4 ○ Multicast ⊘ IPv6 ○ Never via route servers
Last Updated	2019-12-29T14:56:38Z
Notes	If you have a connectivity issue to Amazon then please visit: • IPv4: http://ec2-reachability.amazonaws.com/
	<ul> <li>IPv6: http://ipv6.ec2-reachability.amazonaws.com/</li> <li>And include detail on prefixes you think you have a problem with if you contact our Ops alias. This will reduce time with troubleshooting.</li> </ul>
	The following Amazon US locations and associated IX's carry routes/traffic specific only to the services with infrastructure in that metro. For example, Jacksonville is CloudFront only, whereas Ashburn is CloudFront, EC2, S3, etc.) • Seattle • Palo Alto • San Jose • Los Angeles

<ul> <li>Date</li> </ul>	llas
--------------------------	------

**Public Peering Exchange Points** Filter Exchange 🔻 IPv4 Speed ASN IPv6 **RS** Peer AMS-IX 80.249.210.100 400G 16509 2001:7f8:1::a501:6509:1 Ο AMS-IX 80.249.210.217 400G 16509 2001:7f8:1::a501:6509:2 Ο AMS-IX Chicago 206.108.115.36 100G 16509 2001:504:38:1:0:a501:65 Ο 09:1 100G AMS-IX Hong Kong 103.247.139.10 16509 2001:df0:296::a501:6509: Ο 1 AMS-IX India 223.31.200.29 10G 2001:e48:44:100b:0:a501 16509 Ο :6509:2 AMS-IX India 10G 223.31.200.30 16509 2001:e48:44:100b:0:a501 Ο :6509:1 BBIX Osaka 40G 218.100.9.24 16509 2001:de8:c:2:0:1:6509:1 Ο BBIX Tokyo 218.100.6.52 200G 16509 2001:de8:c::1:6509:1 Ο BBIX Tokyo 218.100.6.207 200G 16509 2001:de8:c::1:6509:2 0 BCIX BCIX Peering LAN 193.178.185.95 200G 16509 2001:7f8:19:1::407d:1 Ο BIX.BG Main 193.169.198.87 100G 16509 2001:7f8:58::407d:0:1 Ο RNIX 194 53 172 122 100G **Private Peering Facilities** Filter Facility 🔻 Country ASN City 151 Front Street West Toronto Canada 16509 Toronto

O a se a d



Search here for a network, IX, or facility.

Advanced Search

#### Telia Carrier

Organization	Telia Group
Also Known As	TeliaSonera, Telia, TSIC
Company Website	http://www.teliacarrier.com/
Primary ASN	1299
IRR as-set/route-set ?	RIPE::AS-TELIANET RIPE::AS-TELIANET-V6
Route Server URL	
Looking Glass URL	https://lg.telia.net/
Network Type	NSP
IPv4 Prefixes	426000
IPv6 Prefixes 🕄	40000
Traffic Levels	1 Tbps+
Traffic Ratios	Balanced
Geographic Scope	Global
Protocols Supported	⊘ Unicast IPv4    Multicast    IPv6    Never via route servers
Last Updated	2020-02-05T11:43:25Z
Notes 🕄	IPv4 + IPv6 Prefixes above would be actuals, not proposed max- prefix values.
	AS1299 is matching RPKI validation state and reject invalid prefixes from peers and customers. Our looking- glass marks validation state for all prefixes. Please review your registered ROAs to reduce number of invalid prefixes.
	All trouble ticket requests or support related emails should be sent to carrier-csc@teliacompany.com.

#### Peering Policy Information

Peering Policy	https://www.teliacarrier.com/dam/jcr:d1e83942-3db1-4334- a5f8- 431578633d26/Telia_Carrier_Global_Peering_Policy.pdf
General Policy	Restrictive

Public Peering Exchange Points		Filter	
Exchange <del>▼</del> ASN	IPv4 IPv6		Speed RS Peer
No filter matches. You may filter by <b>Exchange, ASN</b> or <b>Speed.</b>			
Private Peering Facilities		Filter	
Facility <del>▼</del> ASN	Country City		
<u>365 Data Centers Buffalo (BU1)</u>		es of America	
1299	Buffalo	a of Amoria -	
<u>365 Data Centers Detroit (DT1)</u> 1299	United State Southfield	es of America	
365 Data Centers Nashville (NA1)		s of America	
1299	Nashville	S OF America	
365 Data Centers Tampa (TA1)		s of America	
1299	Tampa	e el / unonou	
3U Rechenzentrum Berlin	Germany		
1299	Berlin		
Altus IT	Croatia		
1299	Zagreb		
Borovaya 57	Russia		
1299	St. Petersbu	irg	
CE Colo Prague	Czechia		
1299	Prague		
CINECA - DC NaMeX	Italy		
1299	Roma		
COD BM-18	Russia		
1299	St.Petersbu	rg	
Caldera21	Italy		
1299	Milan		
CarrierColo Berlin Luetzow (I/P/B/ site B)	Germany		
1299	Berlin		
Cologix MTL3	Canada	0	
1299	Montreal	Screenshot	

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### Internet Routing Registry

- Many major transit providers and several content providers pay attention to what is contained in the Internet Routing Registry
  - There are many IRRs operating, the most commonly used being those hosted by the Regional Internet Registries, RADB, and some transit providers
- Best practice for any AS holder is to document their routing policy in the IRR
  - A route-object is the absolute minimum requirement

### Internet Routing Registry

- IRR objects can be created via the database webinterfaces or submitted via email
- Policy language used to be known as RPSL
- Problems:
  - IRR contains a lot of outdated information
  - Network operators not following best practices
- Some network operators now using RPKI and ROAs to securely indicate the origin AS of their routes
  - Takes priority over IRR entries
  - RPKI and ROAs covered in other presentations

### Internet Routing Registry

Which IRR database to use?

- Members of a Regional Internet Registry are recommended to use their RIR's Internet Routing Registry instance
  - Usually managed via the RIR's member portal giving easy access for creation and update of objects
  - Provided as part of the RIR's services to its members
- Operators who do not belong to any RIR generally use:
  - Their upstream transit provider's Routing Registry (if provided)
  - The RADB
    - https://www.radb.net
    - Note: Placing objects in the RADB requires an annual subscription fee

### Route Object: Purpose

- Documents which Autonomous System number is originating the route listed
- Required by many major transit providers
  - They build their customer and peer filter based on the routeobjects listed in the IRR
  - Referring to at least the 5 RIR routing registries and the RADB
  - Some operators run their own Routing Registry
    - May require their customers to place a Route Object there (if not using the 5 RIR or RADB versions of the IRR)

#### Route Object: Examples

202.144.128.0/20 route: DRUKNET-BLOCK-A1 descr: country: BT notify: ioc@bt.bt mnt-by: MAINT-BT-DRUKNET origin: AS18024 last-modified: 2018-09-18T09:37:40Z APNIC source:

This declares that AS18024 is the origin of 202.144.128.0/20

route6: 2405:D000::/32 descr: DRUKNET-IPV6-BLOCK origin: AS17660 notify: netops@bt.bt mnt-by: MAINT-BT-DRUKNET last-modified: 2010-07-21T03:46:02Z source: APNIC

This declares that AS17660 is the origin of 2405:D000::/32

## AS Object: Purpose

- Documents peering policy with other Autonomous Systems
  - Lists network information
  - Lists contact information
  - Lists routes announced to neighbouring autonomous systems
  - Lists routes accepted from neighbouring autonomous systems
- Some operators pay close attention to what is contained in the AS Object
  - Some configure their border router BGP policy based on what is listed in the AS Object

## AS Object: Example

aut-num:AS17660as-name:DRUKNET-AS	
descr: DrukNet ISP, Bhutan Telecom, Thimphu	
country: BT	
org: ORG-BTL2-AP	
<pre>import: from AS6461 action pref=100; accept ANY</pre>	
export: to AS6461 announce AS-DRUKNET-TRANSIT	
<pre>import: from AS2914 action pref=150; accept ANY</pre>	
export: to AS2914 announce AS-DRUKNET-TRANSIT	
<snip></snip>	
<pre>import: from AS135666 action pref=250; accept AS135666</pre>	
export: to AS135666 announce {0.0.0.0/0} AS-DRUKNET-TRANSIT	
admin-c: DNO1-AP	
tech-c: DNO1-AP Example	es of inbound and
notify: netops@bt_bt	
mnt-irt: IRT-BTTELECOM-BT OULDOUN	d policies – RPSL
mnt-by: APNIC-HM	
mnt-lower: MAINT-BT-DRUKNET	
mnt-routes: MAINT-BT-DRUKNET	
last-modified: 2019-06-09T22:40:10Z	91
source: APNIC	

## AS-Set: Purpose

- The AS-Set is used by network operators to group AS numbers they provide transit for in an easier to manage form
  - Convenient for more complicated policy declarations
  - Used mostly by network operators who build their EBGP filters from their IRR entries
  - Commonly used at Internet Exchange Points to handle large numbers of peers

#### AS-Set: Example

as-set:	AS-DRUKNET-TRANSIT
descr:	DrukNet transit networks
members:	AS17660
members:	AS38004
members:	AS132232
members:	AS134715
members:	AS135666
members:	AS137925
members:	AS59219
members:	AS18024
members:	AS18025
members:	AS137994
admin-c:	DNO1-AP
tech-c:	DNO1-AP
notify:	netops@bt.bt
mnt-by:	MAINT-BT-DRUKNET
last-modified:	2019-01-15T08:51:21Z
source:	APNIC

Lists all the autonomous systems within the AS-DRUKNET-TRANSIT group

#### Summary

#### PeeringDB

- An industry Best Practice so that:
  - Network operators can promote the interconnects they participate in and attract more peering partners

#### IXPDB

- An industry Best Practice so that:
  - Internet Exchange Points can show their participants and help make the interconnect more attractive for potential participants

#### IRR

- An industry Best Practice:
  - So that network operators can document which autonomous system is originating their prefixes
  - Used by network operators to filter prefixes received from their customers and peers

## Route Origin Authorisation

#### Steps to securing the Routing System

#### Route Origin Authorisation

Essential first step to secure the global routing system
 Covered in detail in separate presentation slide deck:

- http://www.bgp4all.com.au/pfs/\_media/workshops/02-rpki.pdf
- But there are some important best practices
  - 1. Signing ROAs
  - 2. Implementing ROV to drop "invalids"

### Route Origin Authorisation (ROA)

- A digital object that contains a list of address prefixes and one AS number
- It is an authority created by a prefix holder to authorise an AS Number to originate one or more specific route advertisements
- Publish a ROA using your RIR member portal
  - Consult your RIR for how to use their member portal to publish your ROAs

### Route Origin Authorisation

#### ■ A typical ROA would look like this:

Prefix	10.10.0/16
Max-Length	/18
Origin-AS	AS65534

There can be more than one ROA per address block

- Allows the operator to originate prefixes from more than one AS
- Caters for changes in routing policy or prefix origin

NB: Only create ROAs for the aggregate and the exact subnets expected in the routing table!!

### Route Origin Validation

- Route Origin Validation means checking if the prefix received has a valid ROA
  - Valid ROA means that the prefix (and subnet) is being originated from the correct origin AS
  - See the "BGP Origin Validation" presentation for more in-depth content
- Implementing ROV means checking the validation database with what is learned from BGP peers:
  - Valid allow; Invalid drop; NotFound allow (at lower preference?)

Problem: how is this implemented in routers day?

#### Route Origin Validation

- The ideal would be to write directly to the active BGP table
- Some implementations use existing EBGP policy handling routines
  - ADJ-RIB-IN: table of all prefixes received prior to policy being applied
  - Route Refresh (RFC2918)
- Routers which maintain the ADJ-RIB-IN:
  - Apply the ROV policy to the stored received BGP table
  - Updates are applied "automatically" to the BGP table and therefore the FIB
  - No impact on any BGP peers (Route Refresh not needed)

### Route Origin Validation

#### ■ Routers which do NOT maintain the ADJ-RIB-IN:

- Apply the ROV policy by sending a Route Refresh to peers
- When there are a large number of ROAs (November 2021 sees over 290k), and frequent changes or updates of ROAs:
  - Routers are sending frequent Route Refresh requests to peers (typically every few minutes)
  - Peers are being "bombarded" by Route Refresh requests: significant resource burden when they send the full or a large portion of the BGP table
  - Severe control plane CPU impact on the peer router (effectively a Denial of Service on the peer router)
- As more and more ROAs are created and altered globally, this problem becomes significantly more serious!

### Route Refresh: Route Origin Validation

- JunOS implements ADJ-RIB-IN by default
  - ROA updates do not cause a problem when operating ROV
- Cisco does not implement ADJ-RIB-IN by default:
  - Applies to all of Cisco IOS/IOS-XE/IOS-XR...
  - MUST turn on soft-reconfiguration if running ROV on the router
  - Soft-reconfiguration is similar concept to ADJ-RIB-IN
     Note that Route Refresh CLI seems to be no longer accessible

#### Enabling Cisco's Soft Reconfiguration

```
router bgp 64510
address-family ipv4
neighbor 100.64.1.1 remote-as 64511
neighbor 100.64.1.1 route-map infilter in
neighbor 100.64.1.1 soft-reconfiguration inbound
```

When the policy needs to be changed:

clear ip bgp 100.64.1.1 soft in

□ Note:

- When "soft-reconfiguration" is enabled, there is no access to the routerefresh capability CLI
- clear ip bgp 100.64.1.1 in also does a soft refresh

## Using Cisco's Soft-Reconfiguration

- Strongly recommended when deploying Route Origin Validation
- Operators will also use soft-reconfiguration when troubleshooting EBGP peer problems
  - Soft reconfiguration enabled on an EBGP session means that the operator can see which prefixes were sent by a neighbour
     before any policy is applied
  - This helps saves arguments between operators about whose BGP filters may have configuration errors!

# Configuration Tips

Of passwords, tricks and templates

## IBGP and IGPs Reminder!

- Make sure loopback is configured on router
  - IBGP between loopbacks, NOT physical interfaces
- Make sure IGP carries loopback IPv4 /32 and IPv6 /128 address
- Consider the DMZ nets:
  - Use unnumbered interfaces?
  - Use next-hop-self on IBGP neighbours
  - Or carry the DMZ IPv4 /30s and IPv6 /127s in the IBGP
  - Basically, keep the DMZ nets out of the IGP!

### IBGP: Next-hop-self

- BGP speaker announces external network to IBGP peers using router's local address (loopback) as next-hop
- Used by many service providers on edge routers
  - Preferable to carrying DMZ point-to-point link addresses in the IGP
  - Reduces size of IGP to just core infrastructure
  - Alternative to using unnumbered interfaces
  - Helps scale network
  - Many service providers consider this "best practice"

## Limiting AS Path Length

- Some BGP implementations have problems with long AS\_PATHS
  - Memory corruption
  - Memory fragmentation
- Even using AS\_PATH prepends, it is not normal to see more than 20 ASNs in a typical AS\_PATH in the Internet Routing Table today
  - The Internet is around 5 ASes deep on average
  - Largest AS\_PATH is usually 16-20 ASNs

```
neighbor x.x.x.x maxas-limit 20
```

### Limiting AS Path Length

#### Some announcements have ridiculous lengths of AS-paths

This example is an error in one IPv6 implementation

\*> 3FFE:1600::/24 22 11537 145 12199 10318 10566 13193 1930 2200 3425 293 5609 5430
13285 6939 14277 1849 33 15589 25336 6830 8002 2042 7610 i

#### This example shows 100 prepends (for no obvious reason)

\*>i193.105.15.0 2516 3257 50404

If your implementation supports it, consider limiting the maximum AS-path length you will accept

### BGP Maximum Prefix Tracking

- Allow configuration of the maximum number of prefixes a BGP router will receive from a peer
- Two level control:
  - Warning threshold: log warning message
  - Maximum: tear down the BGP peering, manual intervention required to restart neighbor <x.x.x.x> maximum-prefix <max> [restart N] [<threshold>] [warning-only]
- restart is an optional keyword which will restart the BGP session N minutes after being torn down
- threshold is an optional parameter between 1 to 100
  - Specify the percentage of <max> that will cause a warning message to be generated. Default is 75%.
- warning-only is an optional keyword which allows log messages to be generated but peering session will not be torn down

### Private-AS – Application


 A network operator with endsites multihomed on their backbone (RFC2270)

#### or

 A corporate network with several regions but connections to the Internet only in the core

#### or

Within a BGP Confederation



### Private-AS – Removal

- Private ASNs MUST be removed from all prefixes announced to the public Internet
  - Include configuration to remove private ASNs in the EBGP template
- As with RFC1918 address space, private ASNs are intended for internal use
  - They must not be leaked to or used on the public Internet


Cisco IOS

```
neighbor x.x.x.x remove-private-AS
```

### BGP TTL "hack"

### Implement RFC5082 on BGP peerings

- (Generalised TTL Security Mechanism)
- Neighbour sets TTL to 255
- Local router expects TTL of incoming BGP packets to be 254
- No one apart from directly attached devices can send BGP packets which arrive with TTL of 254, so any possible attack by a remote miscreant is dropped due to TTL mismatch



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### BGP TTL "hack"

#### □ TTL Hack:

- Both neighbours must agree to use the feature
- TTL check is much easier to perform than MD5
- (Called BTSH BGP TTL Security Hack)
- Provides "security" for BGP sessions
  - In addition to packet filters of course
  - MD5 should still be used for messages which slip through the TTL hack
  - See

https://www.nanog.org/meetings/nanog27/presentations/meyer.pdf for more details

### BGP TTL "hack"

#### Configuration example:

neighbor 100.121.0.2 ttl-security hops 1

#### BGP neighbour status:

Router# sh ip bgp neigh 100.121.0.2
...
Mininum incoming TTL 254, Outgoing TTL 255
Local host: 100.121.0.1, Local port: 41103
Foreign host: 100.121.0.2, Foreign port: 179

The neighbour must set the same configuration

If they don't, the BGP session will not come up

### Templates

Good practice to configure templates for everything

- Vendor defaults tend not to be optimal or even very useful for service providers
- Service providers create their own defaults by using configuration templates

#### EBGP and IBGP examples follow

Also see Team Cymru's BGP templates
 http://www.team-cymru.com/community-services

# IBGP Template Example

- IBGP between loopbacks!
- Next-hop-self
  - Keep DMZ and external point-to-point out of IGP
- Always send communities in IBGP
  - Otherwise BGP policy accidents will happen
  - (Default on some vendor implementations, optional on others)
- Hardwire BGP to version 4
  - Yes, this is being paranoid!
  - Prevents accidental configuration of BGP version 3 which is still supported in some implementations

### IBGP Template Example continued

#### Use passwords on IBGP session

- Not being paranoid, VERY necessary
- It's a secret shared between you and your peer
- If arriving packets don't have the correct MD5 hash, they are ignored
- Helps defeat miscreants who wish to attack BGP sessions
- Powerful preventative tool, especially when combined with filters and the TTL "hack"

# EBGP Template Example

- BGP damping
  - Do NOT use it unless you understand the impact
  - Do NOT use the vendor defaults without thinking
- Cisco's Soft Reconfiguration
  - Do NOT use unless troubleshooting or doing Route Origin Validation it will consume considerable amounts of extra memory for BGP
- Remove private ASNs from announcements
  - Common omission today
- Use extensive filters, with "backup"
  - Use AS-path filters to backup prefix filters
  - Keep policy language for implementing policy, rather than basic filtering

### EBGP Template Example continued

- Use password agreed between you and peer on EBGP session
- Use maximum-prefix tracking
  - Router will warn you if there are sudden increases in BGP table size, bringing down EBGP if desired
- Limit maximum as-path length inbound
- Log changes of neighbour state
  - ...and monitor those logs!
- Make BGP admin distance higher than that of any IGP
  - Otherwise, prefixes heard from outside your network could override your IGP!!

# Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security

Industry Best Practices to ensure Security of the Routing System



### Routing Security

#### Implement the recommendations in https://www.manrs.org

- Prevent propagation of incorrect routing information
   Filter BGP peers, in & out!
- 2. Prevent traffic with spoofed source addresses
   > BCP38 Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding
- 3. Facilitate communication between network operators
  - » NOC to NOC Communication
  - > Up-to-date details in Route and AS Objects, and PeeringDB
- 4. Facilitate validation of routing information
  - » Route Origin Authorisation using RPKI



### MANRS 1)

#### Filtering prefixes inbound and outbound

RFC8212 requires all EBGP implementations to reject prefixes received and announced in the absence of any policy

Advice: Never set up an EBGP session without inbound and outbound prefix filters

If full table required, block at least the bogons (see earlier)

### MANRS 2)

- □ Implementing BCP 38
  - Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding
  - (Deny outbound traffic from customers which has spoofed source addresses)
- Advice: implement uRPF on all single-homed customer facing interfaces
  - Cheaper (CPU & RAM) than implementing packet filters

### MANRS 3)

#### Facilitate NOC to NOC communication

- Know the **direct** NOC contacts for your customer Network Operators, your peer Network Operators, and your upstream Network Operators
- This is not calling their "customer support line"
- Make sure NOC contact info is part of any service contract
- Up to date info in Route and AS Objects
- Up to date AS info in PeeringDB

Advice: NOC contact info for all connected Autonomous Networks is known to your NOC

### MANRS 4)

### Facilitate validation of Routing Information

- RPKI and Route Origin Authorisation (ROA)
- All routes originated need to be signed to indicate that your AS is authorised to originate these routes
   Helps secure the global routing system

### Advice: Sign ROAs for all originated routes using RPKI

- And make sure all customer originated routes are also signed
- Validate received routes from all peers
  - High priority for validated routes
  - Discard invalid routes
  - Low priority for unsigned routes

### MANRS summary

- If your organisation supports and implements all 4 techniques in your network
  - Then join MANRS
  - https://www.manrs.org/join/



MANRS for Operators
 MANRS for IXPs
 MANRS for CDN & Cloud Providers

### Summary

- Use configuration templates
- Standardise the configuration
- Be aware of standard "tricks" to avoid compromise of the BGP session
- Anything to make your life easier, network less prone to errors, network more likely to scale
- Implement the four fundamentals of MANRS
- It's all about scaling if your network won't scale, then it won't be successful

# BGP Best Current Practices

**ISP** Workshops